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An Agambenian Critique Of The
Australian Immigration Detention Camps
Ronya Ramrath
University of Cambridge
Despite all of its pretensions to the contrary, the
famously cruel immigration policies pursued by the Australian
government over the last decades have begun to mar its
image as a human-rights-respecting liberal democracy,
though, I would contend, not nearly enough, given that
other countries (among them the UK) have started looking
to it as an example. Despite the overall lack of scholarship
critically engaging with the Australian detention camps, in
part perhaps owing to the lack of available information thanks
to the government’s politics of secrecy, there has recently
been a new rise in academic interest, due largely to the 2018
publication of a refugee’s memoir detailing the horrors of
immigration detention. Smuggled out in form of text messages
on an illicit mobile phone, Behrouz Boochani’s work (itself
heavily influenced by European philosophy like that of Giorgio
Agamben) is both the chronicle of a silenced narrative and an
invitation to intellectual engagement with the topos of the camp
and its historico-political role in Australia. In this essay, I will
first give a brief overview of immigration detention in Australia
and Agamben’s biopolitical philosophy respectively in order to
then analyse and critique the Australian camps on the basis of
Agamben’s theories, utilising mainly his concepts of the state of
exception and the accompanying homo sacer. I will then consider
Boochani’s insights and his apparent hesitancy toward adopting
the Agambenian notion of ‘exception’, outlining a possible
critique of the term. Finally, I will argue that Agamben’s
conceptualisation can accommodate Boochani’s concerns and
that their respective theoretical narratives merge nicely to allow
a more nuanced critique of the Australian policies and their
effects.
A Historical Overview of Immigration Detention in Australia
Mandatory immigration detention was first introduced
by the Keating government (with bi-partisan support) in
19921, but the project was taken to its extremes by the Howard
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government following the 2001 Tampa affair, in which a
Norwegian freighter carrying 433 rescued refugees was denied
entry to Australian waters, an event that triggered a harsh new
immigration policy known as the Pacific solution.2 A number
of offshore territories were excised from Australia to render
them moot as potential migration zones, and ‘unauthorised
boat people’ arriving at these places were removed to offshore
processing centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea (the latter
of which is signatory to the Refugee Convention with significant
reservations and the former not at all.) They were then
detained in these camps indefinitely without any of the legal
protections theoretically available to asylum seekers processed
on Australian territory, as well as a marked lack of independent
scrutiny
Several cases challenging the intolerable conditions of
detention were brought before the High Court in 2004, to no
avail. Despite a brief bid for a more compassionate policy in
2007, off-shore processing was soon resumed on both Nauru
and Manus Island and brought to new heights with the 2013
Abbott government’s hard-line ‘stop the boats’ campaigning
and ‘zero tolerance’ policy toward ‘illegal maritime arrivals’,
with the declaration that no asylum would be granted to those
arriving by boat no matter how legitimate the claim and launch
of the military ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’.3 The 2015 change
of government again saw little improvement, even following
the 2016 document leak of the so-called ‘Nauru files’ detailing
“the assaults, sexual abuse, self-harm attempts, child abuse
and living conditions endured by asylum seekers”,4 which,
thanks to the complete blocking of media access to the island
and the criminalisation of whistleblowing under the Border
Force Act 2015 (which led to the dismissals of several medical
professionals who dared reveal the deliberate neglect of asylum
seekers, at risk of a prison sentence) had previously gone
largely unpublicised. Although the Morrison government in
2018 promised to ensure the removal of all children from Nauru
by the end of the year following a number of reports of suicidal
behaviour and resignation syndrome,5 the 2019 Medevac bill
(which would have allowed sick refugees to be transported to
the mainland for medical treatment), initially passed against
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the government’s will,6 was repealed soon after.7 Though the
Manus Island Processing Centre has now been closed, the last
detainees who didn’t die from suicide or neglect8 currently
being held in a Brisbane hotel during the pandemic,9 Nauru
remains operational.
Agamben’s Biopolitics and Philosophy of The Camp
Giorgio Agamben, an influential Italian philosopher,
offers some of the more controversial critiques of modern
politics (a matter that hasn’t changed with the advent of the
Covid-19 pandemic).10 The utility of his work for analysing
the discourses of immigration and the concept of the refugee,
both in general and in the specifically Australian context, has
not gone unnoticed, with theorists repeatedly drawing on his
ideas. In line with a range of thinkers, among them Derrida
and Arendt (who both influenced him greatly), he asserts that
there is a paradox at the heart of sovereignty by which the
sovereign is simultaneously “outside and inside the juridical
order as the entity that instituted the law and is thus capable
of suspending its validity. As Agamben formulates it: “the law
is outside itself.”11 In his philosophical complex, this dichotomy
is intimately intertwined both with the notion of the ‘state of
exception’ (in the sense of something taken outside (ex-capere),
rather than simply excluded)12 that emerges from this limbo of
juridical self-suspension, and the ‘bare life’ that inhabits this
liminal space.
Let us consider this notion of ‘bare life’ first: taking his
lead from the Greeks, Agamben draws a distinction between
‘natural’ life (zoe) and ‘good’ or ‘qualified’ life (bios), where zoe
is located outside the sphere of the political and bios within
it. Given this differentiation, he opines that in modernity’s
attempt to (bio-)politicise ‘natural life’ by presenting itself as
a “vindication and liberation of zoe”13 that values life above
all else with the declaration of human rights, the spheres of
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the natural and the political, “outside and inside, bios and zoe,
right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.”14
This zone, which constitutes a ‘state of exception’, is the space
from which the marginalised figure of homo sacer or ‘bare life’
emerges, the “originary political element”15 that presents the
basis of sovereign power.16 Agamben takes this concept of homo
sacer (sacred man) from an “obscure figure of archaic Roman
law”17 representing he “who may be killed yet not sacrificed”18
– occupying the sovereign sphere, i.e., the indistinct space of
exception that is at once outside and inside the law, homo sacer is
simultaneously subject to the law but not protected by it.
It is in this context of bare life that the central notion of
the ‘state of exception’ – which Agamben associates also with
the government increasing its powers in supposed times of
crisis – takes on its full significance, a point he illustrates vividly
with a discussion of the ‘camp as the nomos of the modern’
where he links modernity’s biopolitical tendencies with the
historical rise of the concentration camp. “The camp is the space
that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule”,
the temporary suspension of law localised in a “permanent
spatial arrangement.”19 The inhabitants of the camp are “wholly
reduced to bare life”,20 homines sacri par excellence, residing
in a space that, characterised by the (self-)suspension of the
law, allows for the realisation of “the most absolute conditio
inhumana that has ever existed on earth.”21 An important point
to note here, however, is that this space of exception is not
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 181.
It should be noted here that the distinction between zoe and bare life
in the sense of sacred life, homo sacer, is not entirely clear, thanks to a certain
inconsistency in Agamben’s discussion of the topic – sometimes he equates
zoe with bare life, but in other places he distinguishes between “simple
natural life” and “life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life)” (Ibid., p. 88)
–, which has led to some confusion in critical readings of his texts. Despite
the ambiguities, it becomes fairly clear however that homo sacer is distinct
from zoe, or rather, living in the indistinction between zoe and bios; he is
natural life exposed to the (bio)power of the sovereign.
17
Ibid., p. 8.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., pp. 168-169.
20
Ibid., p. 171.
21
Ibid., p. 166.
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simply outside the normal order, but by being initiated at all
has been taken into the order: “Insofar as the state of exception
is ‘willed,’ it inaugurates a new juridico-political paradigm
in which the norm becomes indistinguishable from the
exception.”22 It is this spatial configuration of indistinction that
Agamben (ominously) calls the “hidden matrix of the politics
in which we are still living.”23 In the modern move from politics
to biopolitics, where life becomes more and more central to
the State, “all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely
real sense, to appear virtually as homines sacri.”24 Thus, as I
will go on to show, Agamben argues that the camps with their
‘exceptional’ status (despite the ordinary associations with
that term as something anomalous and separate) are becoming
characteristic of our contemporary political condition.
Agamben in the Australian Context
The loquacious, mythologising sweep of Agamben’s
analysis can make it difficult to see the immediacy of
application, despite the number of practical examples he
provides in the course of his historico-political investigations,
but the relevance of his concepts to the discussion of both
refugees in general and specifically Australian immigration
politics is evident. The refugee becomes paradigmatic of bare
life, stripped as he is of the rights of the citizen, breaking the
link between “nativity and nationality”25 and thus no longer
represented by the sovereignty of a nation-state. According
to Agamben, the refugee is “the central figure of our political
history”, his rights no longer those of the citizen, thus making
him “truly sacred, in the sense that this term used to have in
the Roman law of the archaic period: doomed to death.”26
Archetypal homines sacri, these are bereft figures who, following
Arendt, “should have embodied rights of man par excellence
[and] signal[…] instead the concept’s radical crisis.”27 Despite
having ostensibly the greatest claim on human rights, these are
only bestowed upon the modern citizen, thus illuminating the
centrality of citizenship, ‘qualified life’ – it is the human qua
citizen, not the human qua human, to whom ‘human rights’

22
23
24
25
26
27

Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 175.
Ibid., p. 111.
Ibid., p. 131.
Agamben, 1993/2000, p. 93.
Agamben, 1995/1998, p. 126.

13

Agambenian Critique Of Australian Immigration Detention Camps

apply.28

Turning now to the specifically Australian context, the
analysis can begin with the state of exception – consider the
process of excision, where the government deterritorialized
swathes of Australian waters and islands in order to remove
them from the ‘migration zone’. What was this, if not the literal
creation of a space of exception in which the laws governing
asylum and the rights of those seeking it are suspended? The
Minasa Bone, landing on Melville Island on the 4th of November,
2003, had arrived on a territory that was in Australia – but not
of. Towed back into international waters, the boat was pointed
toward Indonesia, where the refuge-seeking Kurds onboard
could expect to be returned to Turkey, their escaped point of
origin. With this “marvelous [sic], brutal, incontrovertible logic
of excision”29 – yes, they claimed asylum, but couldn’t, since they
never entered Australia in the first place – the Pacific Solution
with its acts of deterritorialization and offshore detention
arrangements becomes paradigmatic of the state of exception,
creating spaces that are both inside and outside the law and
often consolidating these absurd legislative manoeuvres by
establishing a camp, a permanent exceptional order localised
(both geographically and otherwise) on the margins of the
state. In the “dislocating localization”30 ‘Not-Australia’, the
category of ‘national’ ceases to operate and life within this
space is stripped bare, ‘human’ rights failing to find purchase
without the necessary ‘citizen’-property to substantiate the
claim. In removing the law from a certain space, the Australian
state reveals precisely the paradox Agamben finds within
sovereignty, legislating selectively for its own removal and thus
extending beyond its own purported boundaries.
Thus, the birth of the Australian detention camp can
be traced along the lines of Agamben’s biopolitical narrative,
which he exemplifies with the establishment of the Nazi
concentration camp. Seeds sown in an apparent crisis (in
Agamben’s example, the 1933 Reichstagsbrand in Germany; in
mine, the unchecked arrival of ‘illegal boat people’ in Australia)
go on to trigger a (willed) state of exception (Agamben cites

28
In Australia, these dynamics can also be illustrated by an example
that predates the refugee, namely the Indigenous peoples – they, also, were
not considered citizens and not human as such, in a detrimental double-bind
where it isn’t clear which qualifier was lacking first.
29
Perera, 2007, pp. 201-203.
30
Agamben, 1995/1998, p. 175.
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the ‘Decree for the protection of the people and State’ based on
Schutzhaft in Germany; I would indicate the Pacific Solution and
its excision of offshore territories, in combination with increased
powers for immigration officials in Australia) that then
solidifies into a permanent arrangement (concentration camps
in Germany, offshore detention facilities in Australia). Although
some might balk at comparing the Vernichtungslager of the Third
Reich to the Australian centres, human suffering can hardly
be quantified, and the image of a child sewing its own lips or
becoming catatonic from resignation syndrome holds no less
horror than anything we might come across in regards to the
Nazi camps.
Boochani’s Manus Prison Theory
The work of Behrouz Boochani, Kurdish-Iranian
journalist and author who was detained on Manus Island
from 2013, provides an intellectually informed insight to the
lived experience of asylum seekers in the Australian detention
system, and his ‘Manus Prison Theory’ offers an interesting
complement to Agamben’s more detached ruminations. As I
mentioned, Boochani’s personal engagement with European
thought is evident, and not just from his translator’s remarks to
that effect.31 However, despite the clear influence Agamben had
on him, Boochani problematises the use of the term ‘exception’
as applied to the camps. Nevertheless, as I will argue, I think
Agamben’s concept doesn’t just accommodate this criticism but
also captures Boochani’s central concerns.
During his six years of incarceration, Boochani wrote
a number of articles detailing the human rights abuses he
witnessed, sending information to news organisations and
human rights advocacy groups via a secret mobile phone.
Finally, despairing of the limits of journalistic language, he even
typed out a memoir in text messages, which was translated
and published in 2018 (a time to which he was still imprisoned)
to a number of prizes and accolades. There, Boochani details
the horrifying absurdities and bizarre Kafkaesque logic of the
camp with its endless queues, random privileging and selective
starvation, senseless orders (shrugged off with deference to
‘The Boss’), intermittent withholding of supplies, and denial of
even the most basic human requests (a man is desperate to call
his dying father, but since it isn’t his ‘turn’ he is not permitted
to, despite the other prisoner’s willingness to let him take
their place.) Boochani’s descriptions fit well into Agamben’s
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theoretical frameworks, the prisoners conceived of as bare life
within an unforgiving system ruled by the lack of law that
is exception. They are dehumanised, at the mercy of guards
who have through propaganda or personal experience come
to alienate their charges entirely: “[…] a young guy has slit his
wrists in the toilets. The guard turns to me and says, ‘Sorry – I
can’t understand you and this petrified young guy. I’ve been a
prison guard for most of my life . . . Sorry.’ This is the extent of
his compassion.”32 The Kafkaesque elements recall Agamben’s
analysis of The Trial, the laws of the system “in force without
significance”,33 the refugees under the heel of a bizarre system
lacking all logic. Motifs of Agamben’s philosophy specifically
come up in several interviews, if not always with explicit
reference – his influence is undeniable in the statement “now
we are living in the age of camps”,34 as in Boochani’s talk
of bare bodies and biopolitics, which is all very Homo Sacer.
Boochani even refers explicitly to Agamben’s state of exception
in his 2016 article “Australia, exceptional in its brutality”, which
criticises the July 2013 ‘transfer arrangement’ and the exile of
refugees to offshore camps in the light of Agamben’s theory:
“Our legal status as individuals has been suspended and we
become legally un-nameable beings, transformed into animals
devoid of dignity.”35
However, as noted, Boochani maintains a certain
distance to Agamben’s philosophy and appears to take
issue with the term ‘exception’. In Manus Prison Theory as
developed by Boochani and his collaborators, the relationship
between Australia and Manus Island is tropologically imagined
as a ‘transposable synecdoche’, an interchangeable part/whole
connection that exerts mutual influence. In a recent symposium
by Western Sydney University on ‘The politicisation of
seeking asylum’, his translator Omid Tofighian spoke about
the obstacles faced in theorising the relationship between
Manus Island and Australia: although “we often talk of
Manus prison being (in) a state of exception […] we also argue
that Manus is part of Australia’s history, part of Australian
society and politics, they’re both deeply embedded in the
narrative and the psyche of Australia, a colonial state.”36 As an
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interchangeable part-whole relationship where either site can
act as the regulating whole, it can be considered as “sometimes
exceptional, sometimes not, and this as being interchangeable
and fluid and everchanging. This helps to understand how
Manus Prison can be exceptional and unexceptional at the same
time.”37
I understand this as a reservation with regards to the
concept of exception based on the quotidian idea of it being
isolated, independent of the normal order that governs the
unexceptional, whereas in the construct advanced by Boochani
Australia is bound up in its immigration policy and cannot
detach itself from the horrors practiced on its margins. Boochani
is convinced that this semi-externalised torture damages the
fundamental humanitarian principles Australia professes to
hold, the immigration policy infecting the supposed liberal
democracy and threatening the advent of totalitarian tendencies
in all aspects of life: “You cannot treat refugees in this way and
treat your people the right way.”38 As an example, he draws
a parallel between the system’s use of cigarettes as a means
of control on Manus – “Sometimes they cut the cigarettes and
said that you should do this […] For example, we refused
to give case [sic] to them, they cut the cigarettes. We refused
to go out to the new camps, they cut the cigarettes”39 – and
the similar methods of resource-cutting employed to subdue
environmental activists in Australia. He also cites the silencing
of journalists and the bureaucratic hold on university research
interests via selective allocation of funds, which he claims
has led to the lack of serious scholarship on, for example, the
detention system. These control mechanisms aren’t restricted
to the camps but are replicated in Australia. For Boochani this
is one of the most crucial aspects of the discourse: “if we only
talk about the refugees and say they are victims under this, we
cannot create change. People don’t care about the refugees. […]
This policy is becoming a model for the UK, and I am sure other
countries are looking to it as an example. So, when you torture
the refugees, you are not only torturing the refugees. You are
damaging many things. And […] now it’s a global matter.”40
Thus, his emphasis is less on some isolated state of exception
but rather the (moral and practical) implications these camps
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have for Australia and the world as a whole.
(Un)exceptional States
Despite the concerns Boochani raises regarding the use
of ‘exception’, I argue that it is possible to read Agamben’s
concept of it in a manner that encompasses these ideas – in
fact, I think these ambiguities of (un)exceptionality and the
threat of totalitarianism are precisely what his ‘imperfectly
nihilistic’41 biopolitical theorising strives to expose. Recall
Agamben’s designation of the camp as the ‘nomos of the
modern’, the ‘hidden matrix’ of our present condition, a
provocative thesis that very much anticipates Boochani’s
conviction that totalitarianism cannot be contained: “Sacredness
is a line of flight still present in contemporary politics […]
to the point of ultimately coinciding with the biological life
itself of citizens.”42 Despite the chagrin Agamben apparently
felt at the appropriation of his homo sacer even by American
neo-Republicans in their perceived marginalisation,43 he does
suggest that “if today there is no longer any one clear figure
of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually
homines sacri.”44 Also, although his messianic notion of a coming
‘new politics’ (no longer “founded on the exceptio of bare
life”45) currently remains very much undeveloped, his claim
that today’s “politics knows no value (and, consequently, no
nonvalue) other than life, and until the contradictions that this
fact implies are dissolved, Nazism and fascism […] will remain
stubbornly with us”46 can certainly be construed in line with
Boochani. Thus, it would seem that the bias toward the state
of exception as somehow truly exceptional in the sense that it
presents an outlier to the norm is repealed rather than realised
in Agamben’s work – he repeatedly points out the importance
of learning to recognise “the structure of the camp […] in all
its metamorphoses into the zones d’attentes of our airports
and certain outskirts of our cities,”47 a sentiment that recalls
Boochani’s examples of how the structures of the detention
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centre’s oppressive systems are echoed on the Australian
mainland in all sorts of institutions. It appears that Agamben’s
theoretical frameworks continue to provide an effective basis
from which to critique and challenge the political developments
that are currently taking place both in Australia and, as other
states like the UK increasingly look to it as an example, globally.
Whatever a political future that transcends these aporias of
bare life and the associated threat of totalitarianism may look
like, a penetrating intellectual analysis of the dynamics of the
camp and how these exceed the boundaries of the liminal
spaces we pretend to relegate them to is crucial to exposing the
dangerous trends that can be observed in our contemporary
political culture. Although Agamben’s biopolitical opus
certainly does not present the only perspective from which
to approach this topic, it provides an interesting theoretical
lens, both in terms of tracing the evolution of the camp and
analysing the juridical circumstances that allow for the creation
of ‘bare life’ on its premises and beyond. Several moments
of the Australian policy development become much clearer
when regarded from this Agambenian perspective, as does the
bizarre logic that governs the camp in Boochani’s first-hand
accounts. And although I do not know what other reservations
Boochani may have toward Agamben’s philosophy, despite his
liberal use of the latter’s ideas, the picture Agamben paints of
contemporary politics with the camp as its hidden nomos, as
well as the casting into question of human rights with the rise of
the exception and homo sacer in all aspects of existence, merges
nicely with Boochani’s own warnings of dictatorial overflow
from a policy that is not hermetically sealed on an island and
cannot be practiced selectively. It is only by becoming aware of
these trends through a critical examination of the camps and
the structures they are manifestations of that we can hope to
reverse them, both in Australia and on the global scale.
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Abstract
In this essay, I analyze the three most prominent views
regarding the philosophy of perception- direct realism, indirect
realism, and ideal realism. I consider two relevant problems
of perception, specifically the existence of hallucinations and
perceptual relativity, and to what extent they are problematic
for these views on perception. I first argue that direct realism,
the view typically referred to as ‘common-sense realism’, is
in fact far from common-sense. Although direct realists hold
the common-sense view that we directly perceive physical
objects, they are forced to hold the absurd view that we do
not know what physical objects look, smell, taste, sound, or
feel like. Further, they can never know if their perceptions
are ontologically mind dependent or not. I then argue that
although indirect realism is supposed to bypass the epistemic
problems of perception bogging the direct realist down, its
epistemic issues are at least as severe. Worse, an indirect realist
cannot explain how an unperceived physical object could
produce sensible qualities, and as such suffers from mindbody epistemic problems. I then argue that ideal realism, the
view that physical objects cannot exist unperceived, is the most
consistent and least problematic view regarding the philosophy
of perception. I conclude that we should accept ideal realism as
probably true on the basis of epistemic reasons alone.
Introduction
The primary focus of the philosophy of perception
is to understand the ontological nature of what it is that we
perceive by sense. There are three main views regarding what
the ontological nature of sense experience is, being direct
realism, indirect realism, and ideal realism. Direct realism is
the view that “perception is an immediate or direct awareness
of mind-independent physical objects or events in the external
world.” The term ‘mind-independent physical objects’ is
synonymous with ‘material objects’. The traditional proponent
of direct realism was Thomas Reid. Indirect realism is the view
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that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of minddependent non-physical representations of mind-independent
physical objects, and mediate or indirect awareness of mindindependent physical objects or events in the physical world.
The term ‘mind-dependent non-physical representations
of mind-independent physical objects’ is synonymous with
‘sense data’. The traditional proponents of indirect realism
were Rene Descartes, and John Locke. Ideal realism is the
view that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of
mind-dependent physical objects or events. For an ideal realist,
physical objects cannot exist unperceived, and the term ‘minddependent physical objects’ is synonymous with ‘sensations’.
The most notable ideal realist was Bishop George Berkeley.
In this essay, I argue that ideal realism is the most
consistent view regarding the philosophy of perception. I
begin by defining ‘perceived by sense’, and consequently
provide other important definitions. I proceed to argue that
direct realism, if true, commits its holders to radical epistemic
skepticism. I then argue that indirect realism if true commits
its holders to radical epistemic skepticism. Lastly, I argue that
ideal realism is more epistemically consistent than direct and
indirect realis. I conclude that we should accept ideal realism as
probably right.
Definitions
I understand whatever that is perceived by sense as
properly perceived by sense, or proper objects of the senses,
following Aristotle and George Berkeley. I define what is
properly perceived by sense as irreducibly phenomenal, wholly
perceptible qualities that “would have been perceived if that
same sense had then been first conferred on us”, and things
that are properly perceived are perceived by only one sense.
Colors/light are thus the only proper objects of vision, sounds
of hearing, tastes of the palate, odors of smell, and heat/
hardness/solidity of touch. Proper objects of the senses are
also immediately perceived by the senses, and by immediately
perceived by the senses I mean perceived without being
perceived via suggestion, and without being inferred to exist.
Something is perceived via suggestion if we perceive it in virtue
of it having some habitual connection grounded on experience
with something we immediately perceive. For example, upon
immediately hearing the word “red”, the color red may present
itself to our imagination. But, the color red is not perceived
immediately by hearing, rather it is mediately apprehended
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in virtue of the word we immediately hear, which we’ve come
to associate with the visual color red through experience.
Whatever is perceived via suggestion from wholly perceptible
qualities which we immediately perceive by sense I define
as mediately perceived. What we properly and immediately
perceive by the senses can suggest notions (like emotions, truth,
God, mind, and virtue) which though we’ve never properly
and immediately perceived them, we have an understanding
of what they are in virtue of their definitions or use in linguistic
convention. Otherwise, what we properly and immediately
perceive can suggest something we have previously properly and
immediately perceived by the senses (like a sound or color), to the
imagination- which is where all sensible things are representeddue to a frequently experienced connection between sensible
qualities and notions, or between sensible qualities and other
sensible qualities.
From that which we properly and immediately perceive
by the senses, we can infer the cause of our sensible qualities
through the use of reason. Thus for a direct and indirect realist,
they will infer that a material object is the cause of their sensible
qualities, while for an ideal realist, they will infer some mind
is the cause of their sensible qualities. The sensible qualities
previously properly and immediately perceived by sense that
are suggested to the imagination by current proper objects
of the sense can be termed improper objects of the sense.
Those improper objects of the sense are mediately perceived
by sense. When we properly perceive or hear the word ‘red’
by sound, it may suggest to the imagination an improper
object of sound which is some visual quality we term as red,
though the proper object of sound is strictly what is properly
and immediately heard. In like manner, when we see fire, in
strictness we properly and immediately perceive only colors,
the heat we associate with the fire is suggested to our mind
through experience. Thus, the hotness of the fire is an improper
object of sight, being only suggested to the imagination through
experience, and is a proper object of touch, being felt only
properly, and immediately by sense. Things that are perceived
wholly by the imagination, being not suggested or inferred
to exist, are immediately perceived by the imagination. For
example, when I imagine a red balloon existing in front of
my face, it is not suggested or inferred to exist, and is thus
immediately perceived, not be sense, but by the imagination.
Physical objects must be defined such that it is agreeable
to all three views regarding the philosophy of perception.
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The term ‘physical object’ are often conflated with ‘material
object’, and even often are discussed hand-in-hand: “while
‘physicalism’ is no doubt related to ‘physics’ it is also related
to ‘physical object’ and this in turn is very closely connected
with ‘material object’, and via that, with ‘matter.’” My definition
of physical objects involves two important parts. First,
physical objects occupy the area of extended space perceived
immediately by sense. Second, the existence of physical objects
are not ontologically dependent on the existence of other
physical objects.
Physical objects occupy the mediate area of extended
space perceived by sense, and their existence is not
ontologically dependent on the existence of other physical
objects for indirect realists. Sense data occupy the immediate
area of extended space perceived by sense for indirect realists,
but their existence is ontologically dependent on the existence
of physical objects, and thus sense data are not physical objects.
Physical objects occupy the immediate area of extended space
perceived by sense, and their existence is not ontologically
dependent on the existence of other physical objects for direct
realists and ideal realists. For an ideal realist, however, the
existence of physical objects is ontologically dependent on the
existence of minds. It should be noted that objects perceived
by the imagination are not perceived by sense, thus though I
can imagine a red balloon occupying the visual space in front
of me, it is perceived wholly by the imagination. I think it will
be agreed upon on all hands that this is a neutrally acceptable
definition of ‘physical objects’.
Direct Realism
Direct realists believe that mind-independent physical
objects or material objects are sometimes perceived by sense. In
saying that material objects are sometimes perceived by sense,
direct realists are committed to saying that material objects are
then perceived properly, and immediately. When direct realists
properly and immediately perceive a material object, they say
that the material object appears, seems, or looks, sounds, tastes,
smells, or feels a certain way to a certain person. For example,
when a direct realist perceives an apple, they will say that they
see a material object that looks round, and red. This apple, as it
is in itself or objectively, can exist unperceived by any mind.
The direct realist however cannot say that they perceive
an apple that is round and is red without being only arbitrary.
Without an appeal to reason, there is no non-arbitrary way to
28
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claim that the senses provide us with anything but mutually
incompatible accounts of some property of a physical object.
The way an object looks is relative to a perceiver and thus any
way the object looks has just as good a right to be considered
the real way the material object is as any other way the object
looks. But this would be absurd, a determinate and unchanging
material object cannot be composed of mutually incompatible
properties. If any way the material object appears to us is the
presentation of the objective material object, we could only
be mediately aware of it because we have to reason which
immediately perceived appearance can exist independently of
a perceiver. But, as direct realists are committed to the claim
that they perceive material objects without inference, they
cannot claim a material object is a certain way only by sense,
because it would entail an appeal to reason or an inference, or
else would be only arbitrary. Thus, direct realists believe that
they perceive material objects by sense which appear a certain
way to them, but they do not know how the material object is
in itself objectively, when unperceived. And, whatever criterion
the direct realist appealed to for ascertaining the true qualities
of the physical object could itself be challenged, for whatever
reason one person gives seems no better than the criterion
another gives. After all, we cannot discern whose unique
perceptual apparatus is right for ascertaining the real qualities
of an object, which object would appear different to everybody.
The existence of hallucinations seems to present a
significant challenge to anyone grappling with the philosophy
of perception. In hallucination, what is immediately perceived
is not a mind-independent physical object. If you were to take
a hallucinogenic drug such as LSD, you could hallucinate
a pink elephant existing in your visual field. Now, if I was
suddenly bestowed with your precise perceptual faculties
and perceptual position, perhaps because our brains/minds
were placed in each other’s bodies, I would not experience
pink elephants existing in my/your visual field, for I had not
taken LSD. Thus, when we hallucinate, what we are aware of
is not a mind-independent physical object. What we are aware
of is something that is mind-dependent, being not perceived
by sense, but wholly by the imagination. What we are aware
of is then not a physical object because it does not exist in
space. Given that we are direct realists, our hallucinations
are therefore representations of mind-independent physical
objects. Therefore, for direct realists, when hallucinations
occur, what we are aware of are mind-dependent non-physical
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representations of mind-independent physical objects which are
perceived by the imagination.
This is similar to the definition of sense data I gave in
paragraph one, but subtly and importantly different. Sense data
are immediately perceived by sense; however, hallucinations
are not perceived by sense, they are perceived wholly by
the imagination, and are thus immediately perceived by the
imagination. Sense data are representations of a physical object
existing in some relationship with their correlative sense data.
The hallucinations we experience would not stand in such a
relationship, the pink elephant I see while hallucinating is not a
mental representation of a pink elephant existing roughly in the
place I seem to see it. It seems therefore, that assuming direct
realism is true, the existence of hallucinations is something like
a purely mental image. When we use our imagination to picture
a blue rectangle, there is a mental image that is a blue rectangle
immediately perceived by the imagination. This is what a direct
realist can say happens in cases of hallucination, we perceive
mental images just like we do in any direct application of
the imagination, except that it is not due to our own volition
that the mental images in hallucinations appear to us, like the
occurrence of mental images normally is. Rather, the application
of our imagination during hallucinations is something similar to
the unconscious application of our imagination in our dreams.
Although the existence of hallucinations does not force
the direct realist to accept the existence of sense data, like
many philosophers have thought in the past, the existence of
hallucinations provides a significant epistemological challenge
for the direct realist. As Dicker put it, “the Argument from
Hallucination… should not be regarded as an attempt to
demonstrate that there are sense-data… the argument should
be regarded as yet another way of calling attention… to…
an epistemological problem concerning perception.” The
problem becomes evident if we accept direct realism as true,
for, anytime we perceive something, I ask, can we ever know
if that thing is not mind-dependent? If we sometimes perceive
things that are mind-dependent mental images, but we cannot
distinguish them from anything we perceive in veridical
perception without an appeal to inference, then we can never
know that we perceive material objects, or something that is
not wholly dependent on our mind. Further, if direct realism is
true, the streamlined argument from perceptual relativity that I
presented shows that whenever we do perceive material objects,
we do not know how they are in themselves or objectively, but
30
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rather, some object with we know not what qualities appears a
certain way to us. It would seem therefore, that we never know
if or when we perceive mind independent objects, due to the
existence of hallucinations, and even if we did, we would not
know what they were like, due to the existence of perceptual
relativity. Thus, although direct realism is not metaphysically
inconsistent, its holder is plunged into perhaps the deepest
epistemic skepticism imaginable.
Indirect Realism
Indirect realists believe that mind-independent physical
objects or material objects are perceived mediately by sense,
while only mind-dependent non-physical representations
of these physical objects termed sense data are immediately
perceived by sense. In saying that physical objects are
not perceived immediately by sense, the indirect realist is
committed to saying that material objects are justifiably inferred
to exist from the sense data they perceive immediately. The
supposition of sense data is supposed to help deal with the
epistemological challenges presented to the direct realist. And,
the supposition of the existence of mind-independent physical
objects is supposed to make the existence of the immediate
objects of perception (i.e. sense datum) more probable. An
indirect realist will often infer the existence of physical objects
in the likeness of the sense data they perceive immediately by
sense to help explain the existence of the immediate objects of
sense perception. When an indirect realist perceives an apple,
they will often say that they see a sense datum that is round,
and red, and which consequently gives them reason to suppose
that there is a physical apple which is round, and red, that we
perceive indirectly, insofar as it resembles its correlative sense
datum. This apple, as it is in itself, or objectively, can exist
unperceived by any mind, however the sense data cannot, as
sense data exist necessarily in an object-perceiver relationship.
In saying that the sense datum is round, and red, the
indirect realist is not being only arbitrary, for the way that
sense data seem to us is the way that they are. The indirect
realist accepts the principle that “if X appears F to S, and F is
an irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible quality, then S
immediately perceives a sense datum that is F.” Thus, since the
apple appears or looks round and red, and since roundness and
redness are properly perceived, and because the only things
that are properly perceived are irreducibly phenomenal, wholly
perceptible qualities, the sense datum actually is round and red.
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However, in saying that the physical object or apple is round,
and red, the indirect realist is not being only arbitrary, as the
indirect realist is making an inference. The indirect realist is
reasoning that the physical object is like the sense datum which
they perceive immediately by sense. However, the indirect
realist is fallible in their conjecture because they do not know
how the physical object is with certainty. They can only make
an educated guess as to how the material object is in itself; but
since they are not immediately aware of the physical object,
they can never know how the object is in itself. Thus, like the
direct realist, whatever criteria the indirect realist gives could
itself be challenged.
The existence of hallucinations presents a challenge to
indirect realists, though it is less so a problem for the indirect
realist than to a direct realist. What we are aware of in a
hallucination is not a physical object because it does not exist
in space. However, what we are aware of in hallucinations can
be phenomenally indistinguishable from what we perceive in
veridical perception. Thus, for indirect realists, without the
application of reason it seems we cannot distinguish between
whether we are perceiving a sense datum which represents
a physical object by sense, or rather a hallucinatory image,
which for an indirect realist I will call a mental image. I call
it a mental image instead of a regular sense data because it is
perceived wholly by the imagination, and not by sense. There
are some who would call the objects perceived in hallucinations
sense datum, but the term ‘sense datum’ implies that there is
a physical object which is mediately perceived when a sense
datum is perceived. However, during hallucination, like while
in a dream, no physical object is perceived at all; ergo to call the
object of perception in hallucination a sense datum would be
erroneous. I therefore conclude that the object of hallucinatory
perception is merely a mental image.
The indirect realist has the advantage over the direct
realist with regards to the existence of hallucinations because
when indirect realists perceive something immediately, they
can be sure that they are perceiving something immediately
that is mind-dependent. The direct realist cannot know if
they are perceiving something that is mind-dependent, or
mind-independent immediately by sense, for they know
not if they are perceiving either a physical/material object,
or a mental image. The indirect realist, conversely, knows
that they immediately perceive either a sense datum, or a
mental image, both of which are dependent on the mind of the
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perceiver. Unfortunately for the indirect realist, the existence of
hallucinations still provides a difficult epistemic challenge that
they must overcome. Whenever an indirect realist perceives,
they can never know whether they perceive a physical object
indirectly or not. Although the indirect realist knows the object
of immediate perception is mind-dependent, and is in this sense
in an epistemically privileged position in relation to a direct
realist, they know not if there is really an object of mediate
perception, i.e. a physical object in its place, wherever that may
be.
The indirect realist is, like the direct realist, bogged
with at least two severe, epistemic, perceptual problems. In the
first place, the indirect realist can never know whether they are
perceiving a physical, material object or not due to the existence
of hallucinations. Although the indirect realist can be certain
that the direct or immediate object of perception will always be
mind-dependent, they can never know if they perceive an object
that exists independently of sense perception or not. Secondly,
even if the indirect realism was true and we could sometimes
infer the existence of material objects we perceive mediately,
we could never know with certainty what the physical object
looked like.
Berkeley also pointed out that an indirect realist does
not know how mind-independent (material) objects could
produce mind-dependent qualities (sense datum). Neither do
we know how material objects could act upon mind, nor do we
know how a mind-independent object could imprint a sense
datum on our mind, especially if the sense datum is not like
the object. Further, we would have the same reason to believe a
material object exists whether it did or not, as is evident by the
existence of hallucinations or dreams. It seems therefore, that
the existence of sensible qualities is not better explained by the
existence of mediately perceived material objects, because an
indirect realist does not know how a material object could cause
sense data. The problems of perception and mind seem to make
indirect realism epistemically unattractive.
Ideal Realism
Ideal realists believe that everything that is perceived
are ideas, which exist only in the mind. I define ideas as
irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible, mind-dependent
qualities. Ideas are perfectly known, as they contain nothing
in them besides for how they appear to our mind. However,
there are two types of ideas, being mind-dependent physical
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objects termed ‘sensations’ or ‘real things’ which are perceived
by sense, and mind-dependent non-physical representations
of mind-dependent physical objects termed ‘thoughts’ or
‘images of things’, or ‘mental images’ which are perceived
by the imagination. Sensations or real things are properly
and immediately perceived, being imprinted on the senses.
Thoughts or images of things are either immediately, or
mediately perceived, being perceived mediately by the senses
or immediately by the imagination. When thoughts are
suggested to the imagination by sensations which are properly
and immediately perceived, they are mediately and improperly
perceived by sense, and represented by the imagination.
When thoughts are not suggested to the imagination, but are
perceived wholly by the imagination, they are immediately
perceived by the imagination, being not suggested or inferred
to exist. Thus, when an ideal realist perceives an apple, they will
say that they see a sensation or physical object that is round,
and red. This apple, as it is in itself, or objectively, cannot exist
unperceived by any mind.
In saying that the apple is round, and red, the ideal
realist is not being arbitrary. The way that physical objects
appear for ideal realists is the way that they are. The ideal
realist accepts the principle that “if X appears F to S, and F is
an irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible quality, then
S immediately perceives a sensation that is F.” Thus, since the
apple appears or looks round and red, and since roundness
and redness are properly perceived, and because the only
things that are properly perceived are irreducibly phenomenal,
wholly perceptible qualities, the apple actually is round and
red. Ideal realists therefore believe that they perceive sensations
by sense which appear a certain way to them, and this is
how the physical object is in itself or objectively, because all
physical objects are the way that they appear to us. Thus, for
an ideal realist, there is no problem of perceptual relativity, for
everything that is perceived is an idea that is a certain way,
unlike a direct realist who can never tell when they perceive
the true qualities of the object, and unlike an indirect realist
who can never tell to what extent, or even if their sense data
resembles its correspondent object.
The existence of hallucinations presents an epistemic
challenge to ideal realists similar to the indirect realist, but
it is less significant of a problem for ideal realists than it is
for the indirect or the direct realist. What we are aware of in
hallucinations is not a physical object because it does not exist
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in immediate extended space. However, what we are aware
of in hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable from
what we perceive in veridical perception. Thus, for ideal
realists, without the application of fallible reason, it seems
we cannot distinguish between whether we are perceiving a
physical object or sensation by sense, or rather a hallucinatory
thought by the imagination.
Like the indirect realist, the ideal realist can always
know that the immediate object of perception is minddependent. However, the existence of hallucinations is less
of a problem for the ideal realist than for the direct and
indirect realists because direct and indirect realists can never
be sure if they perceive something that can exist wholly
unperceived at all. When a hallucinogenic sensible quality
is perceived, something that is exclusively mind-dependent
is perceived, as opposed to in veridical perception. But
sometimes hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable
from veridical perception. Thus, direct and indirect realists
could never know if they perceive something that can exist
wholly unperceived, regardless of it being perceived directly
or indirectly. However, for ideal realists, they can always be
sure that they perceive nothing that is mind independent, for
ideal realists only perceive ideas, and ideas are wholly mind
dependent qualities. And, although ideal realists may have
difficulty distinguishing sensations from thoughts without the
use of reason, they still know that however they are appeared
to by ideas is how that idea really is, for the existence of an idea
consists wholly in its being perceived.
Conclusion
Although the existence of hallucinations provides an
epistemic challenge to ideal realists, it is negligible compared
to the epistemic challenge it provides to direct and indirect
realists. Further, the epistemic challenge provided by the
existence of perceptual relativity makes direct and indirect
realism look further unattractive. That is because direct and
indirect realists can never know how physical objects really
are, even if and when they are perceived. This same point does
not apply to ideal realists, who are aware of the way physical
objects are when they are perceived. There is thus no problem
of perceptual relativity for an ideal realist, for their ideas
are perfectly known. Lastly, indirect realists have epistemic
concerns regarding the mind body problem that appear
impossibly to remedy. I conclude my essay by saying that if we
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look at the facts, ideal realism provides the most consistent and
least paradoxical view regarding epistemic knowledge and the
philosophy of perception, and as such should be considered
more likely true.
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Virtuous Civic Friendships: An
Alternative Interpretation of Aristotle’s
Theory of Political Friendship
Kiley Komro
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies three
categories of friendship: friendships of utility, pleasure, and
virtue. He further argues that friendships are a necessary part
of the eudaimon life for people (1155a) as well as a relevant
aspect of a successful and unified polity, for they serve the
legislators’ goal to “expel civil conflict” and promote justice
(1155a25). The question arises as to what type of friendship
best characterizes such ‘civic friendship.’ Many scholars,
including Sibyl Schwartzenbach in her paper “On Civic
Friendships,” take Aristotle to argue that political friendships
are friendships of utility (105). However, I will argue that a
more appropriate interpretation of Aristotle’s work indicates
that political friendship is actually a virtue friendship. Since
Aristotle clearly considers cultivating virtue to be a significant
part of a legislator’s role in a polis, I will argue that it clearly
follows that legislators must not only tend to concord and
justice between the citizens, but also, to foster the best sort
of friendship between citizens. Lastly, I will consider certain
aspects of the United States current political climate to show
the danger of deflating civic friendship to a relationship
grounded solely on utility.
I. Schwartzenbach’s View of Civic Friendship as Utility
Friendship
Schwarzenbach, in her paper “On Civic Friendship,”
argues that modern political thought seems to have
abandoned Aristotle’s premise that a thriving political society
is characterized by friendship between citizens among
themselves and between leaders and their populace. She
states that “a plethora of views on the problem of political
unity… barely mention friendship or else explicitly reject it as
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a serious contender.” Schwarzenbach hopes to counteract this
development by arguing that “political friendship emerges
as a necessary condition for genuine justice” and a unified
“modern state” (98).
Schwarzenbach begins her argument by offering
an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of friendship. She
argues that all types of friendship, including “both pleasure
and [utility] friendships for Aristotle necessarily retain the
aspect of wishing the other well for that other’s own sake”
(100). She further argues that even friendships where “one
loves the other friend under some particular and limited
description only,” such as advantage or utility friendship, the
object of the friends’ love is the other person (100). However,
if this is the case, she still must offer a description to save
Aristotle’s distinction between utility, pleasure, and virtue
friendships. She accomplishes this by arguing that “what in fact
distinguishes virtue friendship from the other two kinds is,
rather, that the description under which one loves the other is
a description of that other’s whole (or near whole) character”
(100).
All of Schwarzenbach’s analyses are directed at
justifying an expansive reading of advantage or utility
friendships so that her underlying assumption that civic
friendships are of that type becomes more palatable. Her
overall goal is to argue that the political unity necessary to
reclaim our overly partisan modern state can be achieved
through a “political friendship, that is, the traits of mutual
awareness, of wishing the other well for their own sake, and
of doing things for the civic friend are still retained… [and]
evidenced in a general concern ” (105). However, I argue that
her interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the three types of
friendship and her categorization of civic friendship is not
strongly supported by the text. Instead, her claims that civic
friendship is characterized by mutual valuing of other citizens
for themselves would be better supported by an interpretation
of Aristotle that places civic friendship in the category of virtue
friendships.
II. Virtue Friendships
Like Schwarzenbach, I think that political unity is
best served by relationships between citizens founded on an
appreciation of each other’s value as a person and a desire that
each citizen receive the good things in life. However, upon my
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analysis of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , I find substantive
evidence that somewhat contradicts Schwarzenbach’s claim that
the quality of ‘valuing the friend for themselves’ is to be found
in all types of friendships. Beginning with his classification of
the types of friendships, Aristotle states that the types of love
are distinguished by “the three objects of love. For each object
of love has a corresponding type of mutual loving” (1156a7). I
take this to mean that utility friendships are those in which the
object of love is not the person themselves, nor the description
under which the person themselves is loved as Schwarzenbach
interpreted. Instead, the object of love is that aspect of the
person that the friend finds useful, or perhaps even the services
the friend provides. Furthermore, in utility friendships the
friends do not wish goods on the other for their own sake,
rather “those who love each other wish goods to each other
[only] insofar as they love each other. Those who love each
other for utility love the other not in his own right, but insofar
as they gain some good for themselves from him” (1156a10).
Aristotle writes further that “those who love for utility or
pleasure, then, are fond of a friend because of what is good or
pleasant for themselves, not insofar as the beloved is who he
is, but insofar as he is useful or pleasant” (1156a15). Thus, we
must search for another explanation for how civic friendships
contain the qualities of valuing the friend for themselves and
their characters, and wish goods for their friend’s own sake as
both Schwarzenbach and I believe they do.
Now that we can set aside utility and pleasure
friendships as contenders for the categorization of civic
friendships, I will turn to the remaining type: virtue
or character friendships. Aristotle argues that virtue
friendships have three main features: they are between
equals (1157b37, 1158b), each friend values the other for
themselves and their whole character (1157b2), and each
friend wants good things for the other, for the other’s sake
(1155b28). He considers these types of friendships the most
complete and friendship-like friendship there is. The other
types of friendships are sometimes said to merely “[bear]
some resemblance to this complete sort” (1157a). There is
one additional qualification of these friendships: “complete
friendship is the friendship of good people similar in
virtue….Hence these people’s friendship lasts as long as
they are good; and virtue is enduring” (1156b7).
Virtue friendships are overall the best friendships,
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according to Aristotle. Such friends value the other for
themselves and their characters. As such, they are willing to
do the work necessary to preserve and maintain their friend’s
virtues (11596). Altogether, it seems that virtue friendships
serve the goals of Schwarzenbach’s civic friendships more
clearly in the text. However, it remains to be seen whether
Aristotle would see it that way. In my next section, I
will advance my argument that Aristotle too would have
categorized civic friendships as virtue friendships, or at the
very least, more like virtue friendships than utility friendships.
III. Virtuous Civic Friendships and Concord
It is clear throughout the sections on friendship in the
Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle sees friendship as an integral
part of a successful political society. He states that “friendship
would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem
to be more concerned about it than about justice” because
good friends won’t need justice and regulations from political
leaders in order to do right by their fellow citizens (1155a25).
Though it is clear Aristotle believes in a sort of civic friendship,
he does not state clearly how to classify it according to his
three kinds of friendship or whether it forms an independent
type of friendship altogether. However, in considering his
description of concord, I argue that virtue friendship would
best characterize civic friendship.
Aristotle states that “concord would seem to be similar
to friendship” (1155a25). Indeed, he goes farther by arguing
that “a city is said to be in concord when [its citizens] agree
on what is advantageous, make the same decision, and act on
their common resolution” (1167a25). Furthermore, “concord,
then, is apparently [civic] friendship… for it is concerned
with advantage and with what affects life [as a whole]”
(1167b, brackets in original). At first glance, this statement
would seem to indicate that concord, and the friendship it
implies, is a relationship based on mutual utility. I argue that
this interpretation is incorrect for in the next breath, Aristotle
claims that “concord is found in decent people…. They
wish for what is just and advantageous, and also seek it in
common” (1167b5) and that “base people, however, cannot be
in concord” (1167b10). Therefore, base people, or unvirtuous
people, cannot develop civic friendships. From these, it seems
quite clear that concord, or civic friendships, must be a sort
of virtue friendship. I think perhaps the source of confusion
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is inappropriately conflating ‘advantage’ with ‘utility’. In the
context of the above passage, the advantage that is discussed
is not for some immediate good for an individual such as
would be served by utility. Rather, it deals with an advantage
that is held in common, shared between the various citizens.
Additionally, the advantage mentioned is that which “affects
life [as a whole]” (1167b, brackets in original) which more
appropriately refers to the advantages of a whole life well lived
with virtue.
Additional evidence for my argument that civic
friendships are virtue friendships can be found earlier
in the text. To clarify the statement that civic friendships
are founded on advantage, I’ll briefly discuss the type
of advantage specific to civic society. In a political
community, Aristotle writes that citizens and legislators
“aim not at some advantage close at hand, but at
advantage for the whole of life” (1160a20). Advantage for
the whole life, I would argue could roughly correspond
to the good. The good, as we know from the rest of
Nicomachean Ethics, is achieved through a whole long life
(1100a7) of activity in accordance with virtue (1099a15)
accompanied by sufficient external goods (1099a30) and
friends (1170b17).
Furthermore, cultivating virtues within their citizens
seems to be part of the excellence of the legislator. Aristotle
wrote “it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve
[the good] for… people and for cities” (1094b10), and “the
goal of political science [is] the best good; and most of its
attention is devoted to the character of the citizens, to make
them good people who do fine actions” (1099b30). Clearly,
there is a relationship between legislators’ goals to promote
concord, chase away enmity between citizens, and develop
their virtue. With legislators necessarily preoccupied with
habituating good character, it seems right that the friendships
that develop between such citizens would recognize the
value of their counterparts as tied up with their virtue. I see
a strong connection with the legislators’ responsibility to tend
to the virtues of the citizens and their other roles around
producing advantageous conditions for people’s whole lives
and their goal of producing concord. Each of these goals feed
into one another. Thus, it seems quite fitting to categorize
the relationships between citizens on a horizontal axis, and
between citizens and their legislators on a vertical axis, as
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virtue friendships.
IV. Legislators’ Responsibility for Civic Virtue and
Concord: Worries About American Politics
Considering politics today, it is quite obvious that
people care about the ethical characters of their fellow citizens.
Citizens worry about the questionably moral choices of their
elected officials–vote trading, bailouts to big corporations over
small businesses, and campaigns marked by big-spender
schmoozing. On top of these activities between legislators,
newspaper opinion columns are replete with editorials
lamenting the rise of rancorous partisanship, especially in the
wake of the 2016 and 2020 elections. It seems quite obvious that
the United States has lost even the semblance of civic unity
or agreement over what is advantageous for the nation as a
whole. I argue that this situation may stem, at least in part,
from an abdication of responsibility by our leaders to “aim
at concord among all, while they try above all to expel civil
conflict, which is enmity” (1155a25). While citizens seem to
care increasingly about their fellow citizens’ moral character,
legislators seem to have set aside any hope of developing any
kind of relationship among citizens marked by mutual valuing
of another for themselves.
Congress has done little to catalyze an appreciation
among citizens of their common good and common goals. Not
only have they failed to address the rising partisanship among
the populace, they seem to fuel it with rhetoric saturated with
political rage and revolving around stimulating contempt and
partisan enmity. Some elected officials, like retiring senator
Tom Udall, have raised concerns about “a culture [that] valued
partisanship over the country’s best interests” (Broadwater).
I think that many of us are tired of the discord and contempt
that marks our political relationships. I believe that one
possible solution to these attitudes is a shift from thinking of
our fellow citizens as means to our individual advantage to
an appreciation of them as people who are valuable in and of
themselves.
In most modern liberal democracies and republics,
there is an underlying doctrine of viewpoint neutrality–that
a precondition for living together in a diverse nation is in part
contingent on one’s fellow citizens minding their own business
on certain (sometimes moral, especially religious) matters.
I am not convinced that such neutrality is inconsistent with
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forming character friendships between citizens. However,
that would be a subject for further questioning. Altogether,
if politicians and ordinary people could begin to cultivate
relationships even at the local or community level founded
on desiring the good things in life for their neighbors because
they are good neighbors, a new culture of unity could arise.
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Attempt at Clarifying Wittgenstein’s
Ethics
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Grinnell College
Abstract
This paper offers an account of the possibility for
a system of normative ethics in a later Wittgensteinean
epistemological context. By adopting a viewpoint of ethics as
fundamentally grounded in ‘practical identities’ as the source
of normative obligations in a manner expressed by thinkers
such as Christine Korsgaard, the paper attempts to clarify and
surpass the quietist and unanalyzable ethical account given
by Wittgenstein himself. Such an approach based on identity
largely mirrors the normative possibilities in speech offered
by ‘forms of life’ in Philosophical Investigations by offering
in-context, normatively rich frameworks in which ethical
statements can be adequately and normatively assessed.
Such a viewpoint accounts for the accepted disagreement in
Wittgenstein’s ethical thoughts by showing the in-context,
identity-based ‘form of life’ differences that lead to acceptable
ethical divergence, while also opening up room for semiuniversal bedrock ethical statements that all humans in a
given social community necessarily are subject to due to
the basic identities implied in being a human being for their
community. Such an account introduces more clarity to the way
that ethical deliberation and disagreement takes shape from a
Wittgensteinian perspective.
Introduction
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein destroys the
determinacy of meaning in language that was and seemingly
still is taken as a given by most people when thinking
philosophically, creating a great skeptical problem for anyone
wanting to adequately communicate with those around them.
Luckily for anyone who wants to use language, Wittgenstein
believes that there is a social solution to this problem and
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seems to claim that normative standards for meaning in
language do exist. There are various interpretations of exactly
what Wittgenstein’s solution involves, but at its base it goes
something like this: “Although there may not be a deeply
philosophically analyzable absolute meaning of any given
sentence, when used in practice by members of a shared social
community, the terms gain normative meaning.” Thus, the
members of a community can communicate with each-other,
and in those contexts, there are normative standards of correct
and incorrect usages of language.
Although Wittgenstein believed in limited normativity
in the meaning of language, he never gave a clear account
of his ethical beliefs and specifically opposed any attempts
to create systems of ethics. Creating a system of ethics
seems to be an attempt to apply a rigid, constricting lens
onto a linguistic landscape incapable of handling such
rigidity. Thus, Wittgenstein only ever comments on ethics
as being an extremely personal subject, and a subject about
which great variation is to be accepted. As Anne-Marie
Christensen describes it, to Wittgenstein, a person’s “ethical
attitude” is “a form of personal worldview.” These personal
ethical worldviews may differ, and they may even differ
fundamentally. If they do differ, there is no sure way to resolve
the difference, as there is no shared standard to which they can
appeal; it is simply a clash between worldviews.
This account of moral disagreement leaves
Wittgenstein’s account of ethical disagreement in a position
somewhat similar to his account of the interactions between
separate linguistic communities. To Wittgenstein, determinacy
in language use only exists within the bounds of a specific
community. Thus, the way in which what is true and untrue
about the world is decided necessarily resides within
communities as well. There is no external measure to appeal
to. Nevertheless, when two linguistic communities meet, it
is possible that one community might critique the beliefs of
the other as inaccurate. It is even possible that a group would
internally critique itself, as has happened numerous times
in scientific and cultural revolutions. In these revolutions,
core assumptions about the way that things work have been
challenged and flipped on their heads. It seems that ethical
disagreement between two individuals for Wittgenstein lies in a
similar position. The disagreeing people simply have disparate
worldviews.
From these disparate worldviews, meaningful
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critique can happen. Wittgenstein even gives examples of
such discussions in an ethical context. That said, how such
meaningful critique is resolved goes unanswered, despite the
fact that it does, in fact, often resolve itself. There is nothing
in Wittgenstein’s philosophical arsenal (ethical or linguistic)
that can help us understand what might happen when two
members of separate linguistic communities or two people
with different ethical worldviews interact. There is no separate,
crystalline fact of the matter that they could appeal to in order
to resolve their disagreement. This lack is already worrying
to what we intuitively feel should be the case in interactions
between communities about scientific matters of fact, but in the
ethical scenario between two members of the same community
such a conclusion feels almost unacceptable. To have ethical
disagreement between two very close people shrouded in
such epistemic fog seems like it might be giving up more than
is needed and obscuring what is a coherent, if a bit difficult,
process for those involved.
In this paper, I will present a potential solution to this
problem. This solution will build a conception of moral decision
making using the concept of ‘practical identity’ provided by
Christine Korsgaard as an analogue to Wittgenstein’s forms of
life which he employs to understand normativity in general uses
of language. Such an approach might help in resolving some of
Wittgenstein’s ethical indeterminacy. Additionally, it will give a
useful analytic lens to understand both personal moral conflicts
and ethical disagreement. Using this lens, moral deliberation
and disagreement is revealed as not a vague interaction of
viewpoints clashing with each other that mysteriously and
inexplicably resolves itself, but rather a negotiation of identities
for the person/s involved.
Practical Identity
At the core of Korsgaard’s ethical theory is the claim
that all obligations are fundamentally a response to a threat
against one or more of our identities. These identities are what
Korsgaard calls “practical identities,” meaning that they aren’t
based on some deep metaphysical claim of identity as a thing
existing from a third person perspective and informed by the
Scientific World View, but rather a practical account of the way
that we experience deliberation from a first person perspective.
Regardless and independent of the existence or nonexistence
from a third-person perspective of some idealized Cartesian
self, the reality of our lived first person decision-making process
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is that “it is as if there were something over and above all of
your desires, something that is you, and that [deliberates and]
chooses which [desire] to act on.” It is this non-metaphysical,
practical you that makes up your overarching practical identity
as a person.
Such an approach of establishing practical identities
may seem like it does not mesh well with a Wittgensteinian
account of things. It may seem like it relies too much on some
a priori method of speculative reasoning that fails the test of
the private language argument (which I will explain shortly)
for lacking a criterion of correctness. This, however, is not
the case. In this argument, it seems to me that Korsgaard is
actually making a somewhat Wittgensteinian argument against
the classical Cartesian view of the self while simultaneously
maintaining the the deliberative agent self as a practically,
although not necessarily metaphysically, existent identity.
Obviously, the classical Cartesian view of the self is
flawed from a Wittgensteinian perspective; it posits a dualist
account of the world that quite blatantly assumes the existence
of a deeply and inherently private view of a self fundamentally
inaccessible to others. This conception fails the test presented
by Wittgenstein’s private language argument. According
to the private language argument, this self could not really
communicate with itself in such a private way, as would be no
external criterion of correctness it can appeal to. To illustrate
this, look at what we might normally do to see whether we’re
right or not. Say I want to know what the date is. Since we
are currently in a 2020 COVID world and the days all blend
together, I’m not 100% sure if my disposition to guess that
it’s December 19th is correct, so I decide to check the calendar
on my phone. After checking the calendar, I realize that I
am wrong. It is, in fact, December 20th. I needed an external
criterion of correctness to compare my internal disposition
to, or else I wouldn’t really know what was right. From this
base, Wittgenstein argues that such a private definition cannot
function. All that such a private definition could possibly
give would be a measure of whether the person who gave
the definition feels that they are using the term properly. That
isn’t much of a standard for truth at all; it’s not verifiable. All
real truth claims require an outside criterion of correctness
with which they can check. Thus, the metaphysically dualist
Cartesian account of selfhood is doomed to fail should we
accept Wittgenstein’s critique of private languages.
In contrast, Korsgaard’s account treats our decision
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making process as a fundamentally public and practical
matter. Korsgaard points out that we do, in fact, experience
a deliberative process as agents, one that is unified by our
identity and fundamentally relies on language as a tool for
representing our reasons. We do, in fact, order, encourage,
blame, obey, and punish ourselves, as Wittgenstein points
out. Our inner monologue is not simply real: it is also public.
If we were to share the language that we use with ourselves
in our deliberative process with others, they would be able
to understand it. Such a process is not a private one in the
sense of a private language, but merely in the sense that it is
a negotiation between parts of ourselves. We may or may not
choose to share this process with other people, but it happens
nonetheless using a publicly available language and employs
publicly shareable reasons. To deny that this account of identity
and agency is resting on an inherently public base would be
to deny that the reasons we use to justify our decisions are
public as well, which is blatantly false when further considered.
The deliberative process is inherently one of negotiation with
ourselves, and we can all explain our reasons as to why we
make the decisions we deliberated over. The results of this
personal deliberation provides us with reasons that we can and
do regularly share. I can explain my reasoning for a decision I
make to anyone, and although they might not agree with me,
we can certainly expect that they will understand me.
Identities of Obligation
In addition to having a single overarching practical
identity as a given individual, each individual also has many
smaller identities. Contingent practical identities such as ‘sister,’
‘doctor,’ or ‘Austrian citizen’ each come with their own sociallydetermined reasons to do certain things and not do others.
A good doctor ought to spend time developing their medical
knowledge and ought not to harm their patient, for example.
Everyone also necessarily shares their identity as
deliberative and social beings who need the social context
provided by their contingent identities to motivate their
decisions and live a meaningful life. In our specific case, this
identity can be referred to as our human identity. This human
identity, being the base upon which our other identities stand,
also provides normative force to our other, contingent identities.
Additionally, it can not be given up without dire consequences,
as to give it up would be to give up our capability for identity
and thus deprive us of our reasons for action. This is why
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we might say that someone “lost themselves” in rage if they
kill someone in a murder of passion; they have temporarily
snapped out of their identity as human. Other identities can
also approach a similar level of importance in our lives when
we become very attached to them. Someone might choose to
die rather than betray their country’s interests because to do
so would be to forsake a national identity that they’ve made
so core to their being that dying is preferable to betraying
it. Ethical decision-making then involves the deliberative
negotiation between our identities and the situations and
urges we face in living our lives. For example, a man might
face a conflict of identity when his family refuses to invite his
boyfriend to a family gathering due to their bigoted beliefs
around sexuality. In this situation, the man must decide
between an obligation from his identity as a member of his
family and an obligation from his identity as a lover and a gay
man (among others).
If someone makes decisions that clash with one of their
identities, then that identity is threatened. If they either make
enough decisions against that identity, or a decision that directly
rules out that identity, then they lose the identity completely.
For an example of losing the identity through making enough
decisions against it, imagine someone who identifies as a
tea enthusiast. If that person suddenly starts choosing coffee
over tea every morning for a week, then their identity as a tea
enthusiast is threatened, and they and the people around them
might start questioning it. “Hey,” a friend might say, “Why did
you stop drinking tea all of the sudden? You drank it every
morning before last week!” If such behavior continues for six
months, then calling that person a tea enthusiast seems to no
longer be applicable, and a friend might call them out on it if
they still insist that they are. “I haven’t seen you drink tea in
half a year with no good excuse! How can you still claim to be a
tea enthusiast!” An example of a decision that instantly destroys
an identity might be one of someone identifying as a member
of their school’s board game club. If they quit the club, then that
identity is instantly destroyed. In almost all cases, it would be
incorrect to continue claiming that you’re a part of board game
club if you’ve formally quit, and the people around them could
also call them out on that. “Stop saying you’re a part of the
board game club! You told everyone you quit!”
As you can see by these examples, identities are
fundamentally public entities. In the social contexts where
a given set of identities is used, they have their meaning by
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dint of the standards set within that social context, and there
are normative standards one must achieve in order to claim
membership in those identity groups. In a society without
music, you cannot identify as a musician. Similarly, the honor
code of a knight during the Middle Ages will be different than
the honor code of a baseball player in our modern day, even
though they would likely both identify as honorable. The
existence of these identities is determined by the shared social
world in which they’re used. The contents of these identities
(i.e. the reasons and obligations they give you), as well as the
criterion under which you can claim ownership to them is
mediated through this inherently public social lens as well.
Korsgaard employs this account of practical identity
to offer a compelling Kantian account of what such decisionmaking necessarily looks like. That said, Korsgaard employs
many claims that a Wittgensteinian perspective might reject in
constructing her account of morality building off of this base.
Regardless, the starting point of practical identity itself is really
what has important implications for pulling back a bit at some
of the vagueness present in Wittgenstein’s account of morality.
Non-Kantian approaches could certainly be built from the base
of obligation that the conception of practical identity provides.
Identities and Forms of Life
One of the terms often discussed in explanations of
Wittgenstein’s conception of linguistic normativity is the
term Lebensform, or “form of life.” Although Wittgenstein
himself doesn’t use the term to any truly great extent, it is an
illuminating term for understanding the type of scenarios in
which a language has normative meaning. To Wittgenstein,
language only gains normative meaning within a given
embodied context. Here’s how I like to think of it: language
cannot be understood in isolation, but requires two levels
of context. The first context is a social one. You must be
indoctrinated into a community that speaks a shared language
in shared contexts before you can adequately understand the
language in use. The second context is a teleological one. You
must employ the language in a specific context of use before
it can be adequately understood. Both of these contexts are
intertwined, with no hard barrier between them. You cannot
understand any given use of language without both.
An example of a form of life can be seen in the
institution of a grocery store and the many activities that you
engage in within it. For example, imagine a woman bringing
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her big cart of items to the checkout lane. In the cart, she has
oats from the bulk section, some produce, and tofu. She begins
placing her items on the conveyor belt, and eventually the
cashier gets to her oats and asks her “What’s the code for that?”
The woman replies “GE30.” This situation requires both that
the woman buying groceries and the cashier have the cultural
knowledge of how supermarkets work, the process of checking
out, and the special process of exchanging codes for items from
the bulk section in order to understand how the language is to
be used in that specific situation. In a different situation with
different context, such language would have absolutely no
meaning, or a completely different one. Asking “What’s the
code for that?” has completely different meaning as a software
programmer, or a spy learning how to communicate using
a cypher. Without knowing the specific context, you cannot
understand the specific utterances and follow the language
game properly. These cultural and teleological contexts are
what make up forms of life.
Wittgenstein’s example of a language game between two
builders in section two of Philosophical Investigations can also
be analyzed from this form of life perspective. In the example,
two people are conversing in a very simple language consisting
solely of words of construction materials, such as ‘slab.’ One
builder will yell ‘slab!’ at the other, and the other builder will go
and fetch them a slab. The language of Wittgenstein’s builders
from section two has meaning in part because they’re using it in
the context of a specific activity. That said, if you take one of the
builders out and replace them with someone without the social
conditioning and training to be a member of their constructionworker community, they won’t have the social context to know
what’s going on and understand the teleological context they’ve
been placed in. If you lack a part of the context required to
participate in the form of life that a language is being used in,
then you won’t be able to adequately understand the use of
language you’re engaging in. For Wittgenstein, language is to
be understood in use.
In the case of the builders, the fact that they live in a
form of life as members in a construction-worker community
seems to express nearly the same meaning as saying that
they are construction workers. It is their entrance into that
community that allows them to identify as construction
workers, and people who can properly assert that they hold the
identity of construction worker can reasonably be expected to
understand the language games that construction workers play.
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Identity, in the sense of practical identity as given by Korsgaard,
seems to bear resemblance to the concept of a form of life. Our
practical identities give us structure around which we can
shape the contours of our life, they give us reasons to make
both mundane and profound decisions in our life, and they
give us boundaries within which we must mostly abide unless
we want to feel the guilt of losing our sense of self. They give
us teleological reasons that we should strive for and a social
context in which we live. In a quite real sense, our identities
express the literal form that our life takes.
Ethical Theories
As forms of life give normativity to language, so too
can identities give normativity to ethical expression and
ethical language. Although such a conception of identity as
the normative scope through which we can evaluate language
would necessarily seem to create a theory of ethics, something
Wittgenstein was quite blatantly against, the rigidity of
the system springing from this theory is not extreme. In
many cases, the account offered by Wittgenstein of differing
worldviews does not greatly differ from such an identity-based
account. That said, the lens of identity can offer more clarity to
the situation.
To illuminate this, let’s take a look at an example used
by Christensen in her account of Wittgenstein’s ethics taken
from a conversation between Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees. In
their conversation, Wittgenstein and Rhees discuss “a man ‘who
has come to the conclusion that he must either leave his wife
or abandon his work within cancer research.’” Wittgenstein
responds: “[s]uppose I am his friend, and I say to him ‘look,
you’ve taken this girl out of her home, and now, by God, you
must stick to her.’ This would be called taking up an ethical
attitude.” He also notes that the man might respond “but what
of suffering humanity? how [sic] can I abandon my research?”
Wittgenstein even notes that the man might consider his wife
“’It probably won’t be fatal for her. She’ll get over it, probably
marry again,’ and so on.” All of these are referring to different
‘ethical attitudes’ that the man could take up in defending his
actions, and Wittgenstein is okay with that.
All of these ‘ethical attitudes’ are just as easily expressed
in terms of identity. In the first case, Wittgenstein is appealing
to the man’s identity as a husband and the duties that come
with marriage. In the second case, the man is responding with
the reasons given to him by his identity as a cancer scientist and
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someone whose work brings good into the world. In the final
case, the man is qualifying the harm done to his wife by arguing
that she can handle the destruction of her identity as his wife.
To Wittgenstein, all of these responses are theoretically valid,
and under an identity-based system they are as well. As we can
see here, although a practical-identity based theory of ethics is
certainly a theory, its system need not be excessively rigid in its
reach. Each of these identities place valid claims on the scientist
in question. The ‘theory’ I offer in this paper is really more a
method to add more clarity to the nature of Wittgensteinian
ethics than any substantive change in the contents of it.
Nonetheless, there are places where a practical-identity
based system of ethics does impose seemingly universal rules
upon us, and those cases come into play when our identity as
human is threatened by an action that we might take. To give
up our identity as human would be to give up our very nature
as a social, deliberative animal in need of having sociallydefined identities which obligate and motivate us. To give up
our human identity would be to give up the base groundwork
that enables us to exist and be ethical creatures in the first place.
It is thus impossible to give up our human identity without
in some moral way dying and losing our membership in our
community. The standards set by this identity as human are
the ethical standards accepted as so right that to question them
would be crazy, and to act against them would be to commit an
‘inhuman’ deed.
Non-negotiable Obligation
One example of such a non-negotiable, ‘human’
obligation would Korsgaard’s account of a conflict between
one’s identity as a solider and their identity as human. While a
good soldier should follow the orders of their superiors, a good
human should not murder the innocent. In such a situation, the
identity of humanity overrides any contingent identity, as to
lose it would be to lose the self.
The identity as human could be considered as giving
us a group of unquestionable, certain statements from a
Wittgensteinean point of view presented in On Certainty. Such
certain statements are basic assumptions that we act on in
normal life, and it does not make sense to doubt them in almost
all contexts. The identity of human comprises obligations so
basic and fundamental to our conceptions of morality that they
are unquestioned for most people outside of truly exceptional
circumstances. For example, behaviors like killing another
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human being for fun or causing completely arbitrary harm to a
person can be quite simply taken as bedrock immoral actions in
our society. These statements could be questioned theoretically,
but practically are taken as a given. In the process of ethical
deliberation with someone who tried to question one of these
bedrock statements of ethical life, many would simply dismiss
them as insane.
Imagine, for example, two people entering an ethical
debate about the permissibility of some hotly debated topic,
say the practice of eating meat. Perhaps the argument of the
person insisting that people should not eat meat may take
Peter Singer’s perspective and explain that animals are sentient
beings just like us who can experience pain just like we do,
and that we have no good reasons to inflict such pain on those
other animals. From an identity perspective, this could be seen
as appealing to our identity as a sentient being who also avoids
pain. If their interlocutor were to simply respond “Well, I don’t
see anything wrong with causing pain to other human people
anyways, why should I care about animals’ pain?”, then the
conversation would be brought to a standstill. Their argument
is inhuman. It is making a claim so contrary to the base moral
assumptions that we share that it becomes almost impossible
to engage with them. In these situations, what they’re saying
is just so absurd that to argue with it no longer makes sense.
They seem to not be a member of our linguistic and ethical
community. When these statements are questioned, we may
have exhausted our justifications and ‘reached bedrock with our
spades turned.’ Perhaps the only answer here is to say “That
claim is simply wrong.”
The Limitations of This View
When I originally set out to write this article, I had much
more lofty goals. I wanted to introduce universally normative
statements within Wittgenstein’s epistemic framework.
Unfortunately, such a goal has proven to be untenable. It
seems impossible to push the inherently limited epistemic
framework adopted by Wittgenstein to accept any standard
of truth that would extend beyond the reach of one languageusing community. Such a conclusion is certainly painful for
anyone aspiring to universal truth in ethics, especially given
how persuasive Wittgenstein’s argumentation is. That said, if
such a viewpoint is all that a careful and honest analysis of the
epistemic situation allows, then we are obligated to adopt it.
The largest reason that I am quite unhappy with this
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result is that it maintains the weirdness that is inherent in
Wittgenstein’s epistemic system. How are we to adequately
account for what happens when two completely separate
language-using communities meet with each other? The
communities have totally separate normative standards of
truth, yet supposedly something will happen in their interaction,
and one view will come out on top. It seems that here we are
necessarily forced into one of two directions. The first possible
route would be to accept that all truth standards are equally
good, and that in such scenarios each community is equally
right. This would be taking a relativist perspective. The second
option would be to reject the very idea of truth in an absolute
sense, claiming that from an outside perspective, to say that
either community is really right would simply be a misuse of
language. There is no criterion of correctness to be had from
this outside perspective. This seems to be this position that
Wittgenstein takes, rather than the relativist one. Such an
account represents the destruction of the ‘capital T’ Truth. At
the very least, it is a claim that argument about such a truth is
altogether impossible (how one could adequately argue for the
existence of such a truth from this framework is beyond me).
Such a conclusion is deeply disappointing, especially in the
context of ethics, where it seems to take some of the weight out
of an area of life which you are expected to make significant
sacrifices for.
Conclusion
Limitations in mind, the framework expressed in
this paper does accomplish a somewhat significant step in
improving the tools of analysis that we have when discussing
ethical disagreement from a Wittgensteinian epistemic
perspective. Under Wittgenstein’s perspective, differences in
worldview are just that: not analyzable in a systematic way and
philosophically non-navigable. By offering an account of how
practical identities are meaningfully similar in (giving context
to moral obligation) to the way that forms of life give context
to other linguistic expressions, I have enabled a somewhat
comparable level of analysis of ethical statements to other
linguistic contexts under a Wittgensteinian framework.
The account offered here is certainly not a complete
one. It still has a few rough edges. Specifically, I think that there
is still room to improve the account of obligation from our
identity as human that is offered in this paper. The claim that
our identity as human is in some way basic makes sense even
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within a Wittgensteinian framework. To call some person or
action inhuman seems to be about the strongest ethical critique
we have available. That said, the claims about our human
identity being the base upon which all other identities build
and the idea of what is essentially a human ‘species being’ as a
social creature in need of identity are perhaps a bit out of place
in a Wittgensteinian system. This is despite the fact that ethical
bedrock claims do undoubtedly exist. Perhaps the structure
they have been fit in within this paper is simply a bit too rigid.
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Analysing and Resisting American
Citizens’ Insensitivity to Civilian
Casualties of American Wars
Henry Barlow
The University of Sydney
American wars have had a considerable toll on the
civilian populations of the countries they have been waged in.
The best estimate of civilian deaths directly caused by coalition
forces in The Iraq War is 11,516, which is three times higher
than the deaths of coalition forces and accounts for 33% of
Iraqi deaths in the war.48 The American public, however, is not
particularly concerned by these casualties. American casualties
play a far larger role in determining public support for wars,
despite the fact that these are often much lower than civilian
casualties (as seen in the figures above).49
Such partiality is to be expected, but the indifference
to civilian casualties should be meliorated for two reasons.
Concern for civilian casualties is good from a moral-epistemic
standpoint, insofar as these casualties are morally concerning.
Many of these wars are partly justified by the aim of improving
these civilians’ lives, hence their deaths at the hands of
US forces are deeply unjust. I cannot explore this complex
question further, so I will assume that more concern for civilian
casualties than the indifference currently displayed is a moralepistemic improvement. These moral-epistemic improvements
can in turn lead to political improvements. The public becoming
more aware that civilian casualties are morally troubling might
lead to greater public outcry about them, which might in turn
lead to changes in foreign policy and military strategy that
reduce civilian casualties.
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In this essay, I will explore the nature of Americans’
insensitivity and propose strategies for meliorating it. I will
argue that the epistemic structures it is rooted in and the fact
that Americans are not aware that they are insensitive mean
that certain strategies are particularly effective in combatting
Americans’ insensitivity. In the first section, I will outline the
social-epistemological terms that will be applied to Americans’
insensitivity - meta-blindness, meta-attitudes, and social
imaginaries. Meta-blindness is José Medina’s term for the
phenomenon whereby insensitive subjects are unaware that
they are insensitive.50 In the second section, I will apply these
concepts to international relations scholar John Tirman’s
analysis of Americans’ insensitivity to civilian casualties. I will
argue that two causes Tirman identifies, orientalism and the
frontier myth, are dominant social imaginaries. Another cause,
orientalist knowledge hierarchies, are meta-attitudes. I will
argue that this implies that American citizens are blind to their
insensitivity, something Tirman doesn’t identify.
In the third section, I will outline the implications of
this analysis for how insensitivity to civilian casualties must
be combatted. I will argue that combatting this insensitivity
requires something beyond pointing out that certain attitudes
are insensitive or presenting sensitive attitudes. Specifically,
it requires targeting meta-blindness and the background
epistemic structures of orientalism and the frontier myth. I
will argue that since these background epistemic structures are
dominant social imaginaries and meta-attitudes, they should be
challenged from different imaginaries and meta-attitudes that
Americans can access. Meta-blindness should be combatted by
engendering the comparison of different epistemic perspectives.

1. Meta-Blindness, Meta-Attitudes, and Social Imaginaries
This section will outline the paper’s governing socialepistemological framework. I will first outline the sense in
which emotions are epistemic attitudes. I will then explain what
Medina means by the term meta-blindness, and set out what
will be meant by the terms “insensitivity”, “concern”, and their
antonyms throughout the paper. Finally, I will outline what
meta-attitudes and social imaginaries are.
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Because Americans have both beliefs and emotions
about civilian casualties, it is important to clarify the epistemic
significance of emotions. I cannot treat these issues in detail,
but will briefly justify the claim that emotions are epistemic
attitudes because they serve as reasons for belief. I will
assume that the perception theory of emotions (which I will
outline shortly) is correct. It is an example of a theory which
sees emotions as involving what D’Arms and Jacobson call
“evaluative presentations” of their objects, and theories of
this kind are currently the majority view in the philosophy of
emotion.51 Analogous arguments to those made in this paper
could be made assuming any other evaluative presentation
theory. 52
Christine Tappolet claims that emotions are perceptual
experiences of an evaluative property, such as fearsomeness or
admirability, in their object.53 If I fear a plant then I perceptually
experience fearsomeness in it. Such perceptions can be fitting
or unfitting depending on whether the object possesses the
property in question.54 Fear of a lion is fitting, while fear of
a sunflower is not. Perceptual experiences do not undertake
epistemic commitments – I can perceptually experience a plant
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as fearsome and yet know that it is not fearsome. Emotions can
nonetheless be seen as epistemic attitudes on the perception
theory in the broad sense of attitudes that are relevant to
epistemic commitments. Tappolet claims that emotions are
reasons for beliefs in the same way visual experiences are: if we
perceive fearsomeness in something, this is a prima facie reason
to believe that it is fearsome.55 This means that emotions are
relevant to knowledge and are thus epistemic attitudes in the
broad sense. Moreover, fittingness is an epistemic norm – fitting
emotions are reasons for correct beliefs, and unfitting emotions
are reasons for incorrect beliefs.
Fitting emotions about civilian casualties, on this view,
lead Americans to correct beliefs and thus have the same moralepistemic and political benefits as correct beliefs. Outrage
about a civilian casualty gives Americans a prima facie reason to
believe that the casualty is outrageous. Outrage about civilian
casualties should therefore be cultivated insofar as civilian
casualties are outrageous, and insofar as believing a casualty
to be outrageous can lead subjects to other correct beliefs, such
as “the casualty was a terrible injustice”. Similarly, unfitting
emotions like joy are prima facie reasons to form incorrect beliefs
like the belief that a casualty is joyous, and so there are benefits
to cultivating more fitting emotions. While the reason joy gives
is firmly overruled by basic moral considerations of the value of
human life, such considerations may not sway certain people,
and replacing joy with a more fitting emotion might bring them
to have correct beliefs. This indicates that emotions and beliefs
have similar importance for my question, and I will speak of
them concurrently as epistemic attitudes.56, 57
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This is not the only way to bring about correct beliefs about civilian
casualties, for one can have unfitting emotions about a casualty and still
acknowledge it as deeply wrong. Nonetheless, attempting to cultivate fitting
emotions in Americans will give them reasons to change their beliefs, and
might thereby cause some of them to do so.
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Fitting emotions might also have distinctive political benefits
due to their greater capacity to motivate action than beliefs. Because I am
discussing emotions as epistemic attitudes, however, it is best to conceive of
their benefits as coming from knowledge, rather than motivation. I will thus
see fitting emotions’ political benefits as I do the benefits of correct beliefs
- actions which follow from people knowing how morally troubling civilian
casualties are. Nonetheless, investigating which strategies should be used to
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I will count absences of emotion as emotions. Thus,
if a civilian casualty is outrageous and someone is apathetic
in the face of it, their emotion is unfitting insofar as they are
not perceiving the property of outrageousness. This is not a
theoretical claim, for I do not think that absences of emotion
are emotions, particularly assuming a perception theory on
which emotions must perceive properties. It is rather a matter of
convenience, insofar as not having a fitting emotion can inhibit
people from acquiring correct beliefs about casualties in the
same way that having an unfitting emotion “proper” like joy
can. While the latter has more potential for distortion insofar as
it gives an active reason to form an incorrect belief, some people
might not consider casualties outrageous unless they have the
prima facie reason outrage gives them. For such people, having
no emotion can inhibit them from reaching correct beliefs
insofar as it inhibits them from feeling outrage, and in this sense
their absences of emotion are “unfitting emotions”.
Medina defines meta-blindness as a subject’s epistemic
blindness with respect to their first-order epistemic attitudes.58
First-order epistemic attitudes are about something that is not
an epistemic attitude – for example, the belief that the earth is
round. Second-order epistemic attitudes are about a subject’s
own first-order epistemic attitudes – for example, A’s belief
that A’s belief that the earth is round is correct. Meta-blindness
always involves first-order epistemic attitudes about features of
one’s social world, and second-order epistemic attitudes which
are incorrect attitudes towards those first-order attitudes.59
One could have first-order attitudes of incorrect beliefs about
others (such as not knowing the difference between Shia and
Sunni Islam), and a second-order attitude which is an incorrect
belief about one’s first-order beliefs (such as thinking that one’s
beliefs cover every part of the social world). The first-order
attitude could also be affective, such as a lack of concern for
the suffering of Muslims.60 Meta-blindness would here lie in an
incorrect second-order belief about this lack of concern, such
paper, would undoubtedly be of interest.
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as thinking that one is not wrong for lacking concern because
the situation does not warrant concern. While the second-order
attitudes could be affective (feeling concerned or unconcerned
about one’s first-order attitudes), only cognitive second-order
attitudes are required for my analysis.61
First-order blindness refers to first-order epistemic
attitudes that are incorrect beliefs or unfitting emotions. I will,
following Medina, refer to both of these as “insensitivities”,
because it best captures the epistemic attitudes that are
the focus of my paper.62 I will also refer to them as “firstorder insensitivities”, even though I do not use the term
“second-order insensitivity”, in order to distinguish them
from meta-blindness. Insensitivities could be cognitive,
such as thinking a civilian casualty isn’t morally wrong, or
affective, such as not feeling outrage at a needless casualty.
Conversely, “sensitivities’ are correct beliefs or fitting emotions.
Correctness and fittingness of beliefs and emotions come
on a scale, so sometimes I will speak of attitudes as more or
less sensitive than one another, rather than as “sensitivities”
and “insensitivities”. Beliefs and emotions about civilian
casualties can be concerned – such as the belief that a casualty
is unjust and outrage at a needless casualty –- or unconcerned.
“Concern” and “unconcern” do not determine whether an
attitude is correct or fitting – a concerned or unconcerned
attitude could, depending on how the world is, be an
insensitivity or a sensitivity. I have, however, assumed that the
world is such that Americans coming to have more concern
about civilian casualties is a moral-epistemic improvement.
Medina defines “meta-attitudes” as epistemic attitudes
about one’s epistemic attitudes.63 Meta-attitudes could take
many shapes, such as attitudes about one’s epistemic abilities.64
For example, epistemic arrogance places undue credence in
one’s beliefs, and an undue lack of credence in contradictory
beliefs.65 Meta-attitudes influence epistemic life in several
ways. For example, they determine which attitudes one takes
seriously, and which are dismissed without consideration.66
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For example, epistemic arrogance leads people to dismiss
anything which conflicts with their current attitudes.67 Metaattitudes also influence epistemic life by determining which
epistemic attitudes a subject seeks out, and what subjects count
as justification.68 Meta-attitudes can be beneficial as well as
harmful – e- empiricism is a beneficial meta-attitude that places
higher credence in attitudes for which there is evidence.
Moira Gatens defines the social imaginary as the
“background” of “imaginings” by which individuals in a
society can understand one another, with these imaginings
including things like images and scripts.69 The social imaginary
consists of many different imaginaries, some of which are
dominant imaginaries such as the patriarchal imaginary and
the white imaginary.70 When something falls outside dominant
social imaginaries, it is “unimaginable” from within them.71
Medina analyses how in To Kill a Mockingbird, “black pity
for white subjects” and “a white girl coming on to” a black
man are shown to be unimaginable within the dominant
white imaginary of Jim Crow Alabama. Instead, the script of
this imaginary read that black people “have a sexual agency
out of control whereas white women lack sexual agency”.72
Imaginaries can also influence affective life, for example by
rendering one unable to experience sympathy for people who
are dehumanised by the imaginary’s scripts.73
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Subjects’ beliefs and emotions are not completely
determined by dominant social imaginaries, for there are what
Medina calls “alternative social imaginaries”.74 For example,
the black imaginary within Jim Crow Alabama challenged the
script of the white imaginary insofar as black people recognised
the incorrectness of the white imaginary’s racist stereotypes.75
People may come to inhabit different imaginaries, and thus be
able to imagine what was previously unimaginable to them.76
Nonetheless, since dominant imaginaries render many contents
of other imaginaries unintelligible, entering other imaginaries is
challenging for subjects under dominant imaginaries.77 Hereon,
I will use “epistemic structures” to refer to both imaginaries and
meta-attitudes.
2. The Insensitivity of American Citizens to Civilian
Casualties
Having outlined the concepts of meta-blindness, metaattitudes, and the social imaginary, I am now in a position to
analyse American citizens’ insensitivity to civilian casualties
in terms of this framework. After going over part of the
empirical evidence for Americans’ insensitivity, I will present
Tirman’s case for orientalism and the frontier myth causing this
insensitivity, noting that both are dominant social imaginaries.
I will then present Tirman’s case for orientalist knowledge
hierarchies causing insensitivity, noting that they are metaattitudes. Finally, I will argue that the influence of these
epistemic structures would cause Americans to be meta-blind.
The implications of this analysis for how insensitivity should be
combatted will be presented in the next section.
Tirman presents empirical evidence for Americans’
insensitivity to civilian casualties, although notes that there
is little survey data on this topic, which he claims is “itself a
symptom” of indifference.78 I will present Tirman’s evidence
for insensitivity to civilian casualties in the wars in Iraq, since
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these wars feature later in my paper. Analysing public polling,
Tirman claims that “American casualties and achievement of
war aims tend to be the key variables of popularity, not local
impact”, which reflects indifference towards civilian casualties.79
Tirman identifies that the public sphere also reflected
indifference: “few major politicians… expressed compassion for
the Iraqis’ suffering; no major religious figures came forward
with calls to help the victims of violence…; editorials about Iraq
in major newspapers rarely mentioned civilian casualties”.80
Tirman doesn’t specify which epistemic attitudes are reflected
in the public polling, but his description of the public sphere’s
reaction indicates that Americans’ insensitivity involves both
beliefs about the moral seriousness of civilian casualties and
emotions directed towards those casualties. Tirman gives
several causes of this insensitivity: government narratives,
psychological defence mechanisms, orientalism, and the frontier
myth.81 The latter two will be the focus of my analysis, because
they most clearly demonstrate why Americans are meta-blind.
Tirman identifies both orientalism and the frontier myth
as causes of American insensitivity, and while Tirman doesn’t
use this term, both are dominant imaginaries. Margaret Kohn
and Kavita Reddy define Edward Said’s concept of orientalism
as referring to “a structured set of concepts, assumptions, and
discursive practices” prevalent during colonial Europe “that
were used to produce, interpret, and evaluate knowledge
about non-European peoples”.82 These assumptions included
associating negative traits with non-European people, with
Said giving the example of seeing “the Arab” “as an oversexed
degenerate,… sadistic, treacherous, low.”83 Said also identifies
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that Arab people are not seen in their specificity as human
beings under orientalism: “The Arab is always shown in
large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics
or experiences”.84 Tirman identifies that these orientalist
assumptions have underlain American attitudes towards the
civilian populations of American wars, and have reinforced
insensitivity.85 These populations have often been Asian and
Arab populations who are subject to orientalist stereotypes.
Furthermore, Tirman notes that American empire has been
“based in part on a supposition of white superiority”, and that
the American military has notably used such racial slurs as
“gooks” and “hajis”.86 Orientalism is a social imaginary which
Americans inhabit, since it is based on representations of Asian
and Arab populations. Moreover, it is a dominant imaginary,
insofar as non-orientalist imaginaries are less accessible to
Americans than orientalist imaginaries.
This imaginary engenders insensitivity. In their research
on Israeli citizens’ reactions to Palestinian civilians dying at the
hands of Israeli forces, social psychologist Noa Schori-Eyal and
collaborators found that viewing civilians harmed in war in
dehumanising ways leads to perceiving them as less common
with oneself.87 This, in turn, makes one more likely to tolerate
harms to those civilians.88 Americans influenced by orientalism
see civilians in derogatory and dehumanising ways, and are
therefore less likely to form concerned attitudes about civilian
casualties.
Tirman defines the frontier myth as a “set of ideas,
myths, and self-identities” in which America is seen as having
a “mission” of “taming… the wilderness” and the “savages”
who live there.89 The earliest example of this in the public
conscience is the violence European-American colonisers
committed against Indigenous peoples, and Tirman claims
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that the myth has underlain American global expansion.90 He
identifies a particular conception of violence as central to this
myth. Firstly, the violence is seen as “defensive” or “reactive”,
responding to provocation from external forces (for example, to
provocation from “Indian savagery”).91 Secondly, the violence
is seen as “regenerative”, as reaffirming the “moral worth of
its practitioner.” In the modern context, this takes the form
of reaffirming “the natural rightness of Anglo-Saxon liberty”,
among other things.92
This is a dominant imaginary, and Tirman claims
that it underlies American responses to civilian casualties
and engenders insensitivity. While Tirman doesn’t label it as
an imaginary, he notes it is deeply rooted in the American
psyche and “powerfully shapes the attitudes and behaviour of
Americans from childhood.”93 This imaginary structures how
Americans see wars and the civilians in them, since American
wars are often framed under the lenses of defensive and
regenerative violence (for example, The Iraq War was seen as
regeneration after “a period of softness” which had resulted, in
this imaginary, in 9/11).94 This way of seeing wars engenders
insensitivity. Tirman identifies that it creates a script on which
civilians are not the focus, being rather “players in this drama”
which is truly about America’s moral redemption.95 Americans’
reactions to civilian casualties are determined by this script,
which stifles concern insofar as it accords no harm to civilians,
or frames harms that do occur as justified insofar as they are
defensive and regenerative.96
Tirman claims that another side of orientalism fosters
insensitivity, namely hierarchies of knowledge which mediate
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the way in which people in “The Orient” are understood.97
These knowledge hierarchies are meta-attitudes. American
orientalist knowledge hierarchies unduly privilege the
American social sciences, such as historiography and
international relations. These disciplines are thought to lead
to “knowledge” of other cultures, while voices from those
cultures “are not heard”, and “are discounted as… ignorant”
on the rare occasions when they are heard (Tirman cites the
US public’s reaction to the polls of Iraqi civilians).98 Such
knowledge hierarchies constitute a meta-attitude about
what counts as “knowledge” of these civilians, namely that
“knowledge” of them does not come from their mouths, hearts,
and bodies, but from American expertise. Tirman claims that
these knowledge hierarchies engender American insensitivity
because they makes it such that the American public “knows”,
with “scientific veracity”, that foreign populations have traits
which justify violence (for example, having “no appreciation
for freedom”).99 This makes Americans see their unconcerned
attitudes towards civilian casualties, that are in fact insensitive,
as justified.
The preceding analyses indicate that American citizens
are meta-blind because these citizens have epistemic structures
which block epistemic counterpoints, and can avail themselves
of several justifications for their cognitively and affectively
insensitive attitudes.100 Medina calls epistemic attitudes
that conflict with one’s own “epistemic counterpoints”.101
The imaginaries of orientalism and the frontier myth
inhibit Americans from experiencing such counterpoints by
rendering concerned attitudes towards civilian casualties
unimaginable. This unimaginability inhibits Americans from
coming to concerned attitudes themselves, which might act as
counterpoints to their other epistemic attitudes. For example,
perhaps without the imaginary of orientalism an American
might feel sympathy for the family of a civilian casualty, which
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would challenge their belief that “that killing was, on balance,
justified.” The unimaginability of sensitive attitudes can also
distort Americans’ interpretations of epistemic counterpoints
that others articulate. Imagine someone expresses the belief that
a civilian casualty was unjust. Such concern is incompatible
with the orientalist imaginary, so it might be distorted for
someone living under that imaginary – they might see it as a
mere expression of the speaker’s sadness about their day, rather
than a claim about the world. Thus, the imaginaries preclude
Americans from experiencing concerned attitudes (whether
held by themselves or others) which would challenge their
insensitivity. This makes them unable to acknowledge that their
beliefs and emotions are insensitive, rendering them metablind.
Even if Americans did experience epistemic
counterpoints, however, their imaginaries and meta-attitudes
would diminish the counterpoints’ ability to make them
aware of their limitations. This is because these structures
distort Americans’ judgments of which attitudes are sensitive
and which insensitive. I have argued that knowledge
hierarchies engender first-order insensitivity by justifying
unconcerned attitudes, but this justification also entrenches
meta-blindness by making Americans see their insensitive
attitudes as sensitive.102 According to these meta-attitudes,
unconcerned attitudes are correct or fitting since they accord
with American “expertise” and are not blinded by “inferior”
forms of knowledge. The imaginaries similarly justify
unconcerned attitudes. The frontier myth renders unconcerned
beliefs and emotions about civilian casualties sensitive, since
they correctly respond to the properties of American moral
regeneration, and are not blinded by considerations irrelevant
to the expansion of the frontier. Deep concern is an insensitive
attitude towards civilian casualties according to the orientalist
imaginary, on which civilians are unworthy of respect and
lack the individuality which might give special value to their
lives. According to this imaginary, callous attitudes, rather
than concerned ones, correctly perceive the properties of
civilian casualties. Thus, these imaginaries and meta-attitudes
make Americans see their unconcerned attitudes, which are
insensitive, as sensitive. These are incorrect attitudes towards
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their beliefs and emotions about civilian casualties, and thus
constitute meta-blindness.
3. Combatting Insensitivity
I have claimed that American citizens are meta-blind
with respect to their insensitivity to civilian casualties, and that
this meta-blindness is rooted in the dominant imaginaries of
orientalism and the frontier myth, as well as the meta-attitudes
of orientalist knowledge hierarchies. I will now show how
this analysis suggests ways in which insensitivity should be
combatted. I will first outline two seemingly intuitive strategies
for combatting insensitivity, which do not target meta-blindness
or background epistemic structures: highlighting insensitivity
and presenting sensitive attitudes. I will then argue that
such strategies are inadequate, and background epistemic
structures and meta-blindness must be directly targeted. I will
suggest strategies that directly target each of these. Epistemic
structures can be challenged by utilising different imaginaries
and meta-attitudes, while meta-blindness can be challenged by
engendering comparison of different epistemic perspectives.
I will give concrete examples of these strategies from the
MoMA’s exhibition “Theater of Operations: The Gulf Wars
1991-2011”.103
An intuitive way of combatting American insensitivity
focuses on first-order insensitive attitudes without regard to
their background epistemic structures or Americans’ metablindness. Two strategies which do this are highlighting
insensitivity and presenting sensitive attitudes. Imagine that
someone expresses a callous attitude towards a civilian casualty
like “their life wasn’t worth much”. Highlighting insensitivity
involves telling the speaker that what they said was insensitive,
for example by saying “that’s quite callous of you”. Presenting
a sensitive attitude involves exhibiting a concerned attitude
towards the casualties, for example saying “that attack was
horrific”.
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These methods, while effective to some extent, are
insufficient as a complete strategy for combatting American
insensitivity, since forms of insensitivity may remain in
the face of such challenges unless epistemic structures and
meta-blindness are directly targeted. If Americans’ epistemic
structures are not targeted, the challenges identified above
will often be unimaginable or unjustified to them. As
previously identified, Americans often interpret sensitive
attitudes incorrectly due to the imaginaries’ distortions.
Even if sensitive attitudes can be correctly interpreted, they
might be written off as insensitive since meta-attitudes and
imaginaries distort judgments of sensitivity and insensitivity.
Similarly, highlighting insensitivity might be ineffective, as
the insensitive subject might think that their attitude is not
insensitive – they’re not callous, they’re having a clear-thinking
reaction to a justified killing. Because of these ways in which
insensitivities can remain in the face of first-order challenges to
insensitivity, orientalism and the frontier myth must be directly
targeted. Because I analysed them as imaginaries and metaattitudes, I can avail myself of Medina’s strategy for combatting
such epistemic structures. This is the strategy of challenging
epistemic structures from different epistemic structures that
Americans may access.
Recall that subjects in dominant imaginaries are
not wholly stuck there, but can enter different imaginaries.
Alternative social imaginaries can challenge the dominant
one.104 For example, perhaps certain American citizens can
enter a pacifist imaginary and see the world through its
lens. This might lead them to outrage at civilian casualties.
Nonetheless, alternative imaginaries might be inaccessible to
one who is stuck within a dominant imaginary that renders
the contents of alternative imaginaries unimaginable or
unjustified. The frontier myth renders it unimaginable that
peace could be sustained, because that would end the frontier
myth.105 Therefore, subjects who inhabit the frontier myth
might be unable to inhabit a pacifist imaginary. This means that
resistance from within a different dominant imaginary could be
necessary.106 For example, Dia al-Azzawi’s painting “Mission of
Destruction” directly challenges the frontier myth by drawing
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on Picasso’s “Guernica” (American troops are on the right,
Iraqis on the left):107

Dia al-Azzawi, “Mission of Destruction”
“Guernica” is not a dominant imaginary in American
society as a whole, but it is in the context of a modern art
gallery. This painting uses this imaginary to frame American
troops not as saviours or as engaging in regenerative violence,
but as engaging in violence equivalent to the horrifying
violence of “Guernica”. This uses a different dominant
imaginary which people in the art gallery inhabit (“Guernica”)
to challenge the frontier myth.
Similar strategies can be used to challenge metaattitudes. Challenges can come from meta-attitudes the subject
doesn’t currently possess, but can come to possess, such as
meta-attitudes which privilege local knowledge over American
“expertise”. Alternatively, challenges can come from a different
meta-attitude the subject currently possesses, for example using
the meta-attitude of empiricism to challenge the meta-attitude
of privileging American expertise, as this expertise gets things
empirically wrong (for example, being wrong about what
will be politically stabilising). Thus, combatting Americans’
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insensitivity requires directly targeting background epistemic
structures, and my analysis of their insensitivity suggests
doing this by challenging Americans’ epistemic structures from
different epistemic structures they can access.
Combatting insensitivity to civilian casualties also
requires targeting meta-blindness directly. Combatting
meta-blindness involves creating an awareness of first-order
insensitivities.108 For Americans, this would be an awareness
of their inability to have certain beliefs about and affective
attitudes towards civilian casualties. In order to ensure that
Americans overcome insensitivities in new contexts that
generate new insensitivities, Americans must be vigilant about
checking their epistemic limitations and seeking out alternative
perspectives that might correct those limitations. These
habits can be fostered by combatting meta-blindness to make
them aware that they have limitations. It might be that some
level of awareness of limitations is achieved by highlighting
insensitivities and presenting sensitivities, since one might
become humbler upon being corrected. This is by no means
guaranteed, however. We should therefore consider strategies
which try to directly combat meta-blindness.
The strategy Medina proposes for combatting metablindness is encouraging people to compare different epistemic
perspectives with their own.109 Through a comparison of
sensitive and insensitive perspectives on civilian casualties,
insensitive subjects can become more aware of their epistemic
limitations. If an American compares their perspective on
civilian casualties with an Iraqi’s, the more concerned attitudes
in the latter than in the former are highlighted. The American
might thereby realise that such concern is sensitive, and their
absence of concern is insensitive.110 “Theater of Operations”
encourages its audience to engage in such comparison. It
contains works by both Western and non-Western artists,
including artists from Iraq and Kuwait, allowing comparison
not merely between cognitive perspectives, but affective ones as
well, insofar as these perspectives are expressed in emotionally
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charged artworks.111 For example, many works focus on media
representations of the Gulf War. Michel Auder’s “Gulf War TV
War” plays footage from contemporary news broadcasts.112

Michel Auder, “Gulf War TV War”
These images depict the war as, in Tim Arango’s words,
“a sanitized… war without a lot of casualties”.113 They convey
the dominant epistemic perspective, and it is insensitive to
civilian casualties. The work also conveys Auder’s perspective,
which criticises the dominant perspective without showing
what that perspective misses. Yet the exhibition also contains
works from Iraqi artists which present sensitive attitudes that
the dominant perspective misses. Hanaa Malallah’s “She/He
Has No Picture” is a series of portraits of the victims of a US
bomb strike that killed 400 people in the Amiriyah shelter.114
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Hanaa Malallah, “She/He Has No Picture”
The texture of these paintings is disrupted, making
it seem like they are disintegrating. This disintegration is
juxtaposed with the often lively, smiling faces, conveying a
great sense of loss.115 Mallalah’s works mourns these casualties,
and this is a sensitive attitude towards them. Considered alone,
Auder’s work and Malallah’s highlight an insensitivity and
present a sensitivity, respectively. The exhibition as a whole,
however, allows for direct comparison of Malallah’s sensitive
perspective with the perspective of the American media,
promoting awareness of the absence of concern in the latter
perspective. Viewers can also compare it with Auder’s critical
perspective, seeing that Auder does not perceive what is missed
by the dominant perspective and acknowledging this as a blind
spot in Auder’s perspective.
4. Conclusion
American citizens are meta-blind with respect to
their insensitivity to civilian casualties: they do not know
that they are insensitive. Their insensitivity is rooted in the
dominant social imaginaries of orientalism and the frontier
myth, as well as in the meta-attitude of orientalist knowledge
hierarchies. This means Americans are likely meta-blind, since
these epistemic structures prevent them from engaging with
epistemic counterpoints that would make them aware that they
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are insensitive, and distort their judgments of which attitudes
are sensitive and which insensitive.
Identifying the role of imaginaries, meta-attitudes, and
meta-blindness in American insensitivity has implications for
how insensitivity should be combatted. Effectively combatting
insensitivity requires directly targeting Americans’ metablindness and their background epistemic structures. I thus
suggest two strategies for combatting insensitivity –- comparing
differing epistemic perspectives to combat meta-blindness,
and using different epistemic structures Americans can access
to challenge the epistemic structures of orientalism and the
frontier myth.
I have provided a novel analysis of Americans’
insensitivity to civilian casualties, and suggested novel ways
for combatting this insensitivity. The effectiveness of various
strategies is not settled by the arguments I have presented, and
interdisciplinary empirical work needs to be done to determine
which strategies are the most effective. Finding the best strategy
possible is necessary for producing the moral-epistemic
and political benefits of combatting insensitivity to civilian
casualties.
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